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When “Yes” Means “No”: 
McCarran–Ferguson,  
the New York Convention, and  
the Limits of Congressional Assent 
 
Aaron L. Wells* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the use of arbitration as a means of international 
commercial dispute resolution has multiplied,1 and it is now estimated that 
90% of cross-border contracts include agreements to arbitrate in the event of 
a conflict.2  In particular, arbitration clauses are frequently being included in 
insurance agreements.3  Arbitration is an enormously significant right when 
a contract provides for it—it offers the guarantee of neutrality and control, 
and assures parties to arbitration agreements they will not find themselves 
dragged into an unsympathetic foreign court.4 
 
* Aaron L. Wells received his J.D. in 2012 from Washington and Lee University School of Law.  
The author is indebted to Patrick Barthle for listening to a lot of mindless babble and a few coherent 
thoughts, to Billie for waiting up, to the Volume 68 Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law 
Review for their guidance, to my loved ones for their patience, and particularly to the Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal for their tireless and superlative work. 
 1. Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United 
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 233 (2006) (“Between 1993 and 2003, the number of international 
arbitration proceedings administered by leading institutions almost doubled.”). 
 2. Id. (“Estimates are that 90% of international contracts include an arbitration clause.”). 
 3. Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 253 (2004–2005) (“[A]rbitraton provisions are 
appearing with increasing frequency in all types of insurance policies . . . .”). 
 4. MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (2008) (“Arbitration . . . gives the parties substantial autonomy and control over the 
process . . . .  This is particularly important in international commercial arbitration because parties do 
not want to be subject to the jurisdiction of the other party’s court system.  Each party fears the other 
party’s ‘home court advantage.’”). 
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The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards5 (New York Convention or Convention) is the 
Magna Carta of international arbitration.6  With 145 nations that are parties 
to the New York Convention,7 it serves to guarantee the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements worldwide,8 and is largely responsible for the growth 
and success of arbitration in international commercial agreements.9  The 
United States is a party to the treaty,10 and has implemented the treaty 
through federal legislation.11  However, in the context of international 
insurance agreements with arbitration provisions, the New York Convention 
is routinely rendered impotent by the McCarran–Ferguson Act,12 a federal 
statute that is often deemed to preempt the New York Convention.13 
The McCarran–Ferguson Act was enacted in 1945 to prevent federal 
legislation of general applicability from interfering with the states’ authority 
to regulate the insurance industry.14  It was enacted in response to a shocking 
about-face on the part of the U.S. Supreme Court, deeming the insurance 
industry a part of interstate commerce after seventy-five years of holding the 
opposite.15  Congress, not eager to either intrude on the insurance industry 
and the states or to take on a gargantuan American industry overnight, 
enacted the McCarran–Ferguson Act with the express purpose of turning 
back the clock and reversing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision.16  The 
McCarran–Ferguson Act is unique in its operation: It “reverse preempts” 
 
 5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention] (establishing a 
mechanism through which arbitral agreements and awards may be universally enforced). 
 6. See infra notes 118–120 and accompanying text (stating that commentators have deemed 
the New York Convention the most important development in international commercial arbitration). 
 7. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that there are 145 nations that are 
party to the New York Convention). 
 8. See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text (stating that the Convention ensures the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
 9. See infra text accompanying note 121 (“[T]he New York Convention is credited with 
being chiefly responsible for the rapid increase in the employment and effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements in the years since its inception.”). 
 10. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (stating that the United States has ratified the 
New York Convention). 
 11. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (stating that the United States has implemented 
the New York Convention). 
 12. McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006) (reverse preempting federal law 
of general applicability in favor of state law regulating the insurance industry). 
 13. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing a case in which the New York Convention was 
preempted by the McCarran–Ferguson Act). 
 14. See infra Part II.A.3 (describing the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s enactment and operation). 
 15. See infra Part II.A.2–3 (recounting the case that the McCarran–Ferguson Act reversed). 
 16. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the history behind the McCarran–Ferguson Act). 
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federal legislation of general applicability in favor of state legislation 
governing the insurance industry.17 
The New York Convention and McCarran–Ferguson Act clash in a 
single setting.  Twenty states have enacted legislation declaring arbitration 
clauses void in international insurance agreements.18  When the question 
arises in courts as to whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act can reverse the 
New York Convention in favor of the arbitration-averse state legislation, a 
host of legal issues arise.19 
While this question is posed to lower courts with some frequency and 
with a startling variety of results, most of these decisions are unpublished 
and lack precedential value.20  These lower court decisions can almost never 
be appealed.21  Therefore, the question has only been posed to the U.S. 
courts of appeals twice, and has created a circuit split.22  A workable 
framework that can consistently be applied is sorely needed.  This Article 
provides such a framework.23 
This Article begins in Part II.A–B by describing the history and 
operation of the McCarran–Ferguson Act and the New York Convention.  
Part II.C analyzes the current jurisprudence on the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties, and concludes that the New York 
Convention is non-self-executing.  Part II.D delineates the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the Foreign Commerce Clause, and describes how 
the Foreign Commerce Clause actually prohibits preemption of the New 
 
 17. See infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (relating in detail the operation of 
McCarran–Ferguson). 
 18. Peter M. Flanagan & Jason M. Adler, The Enforceability of State Anti-Arbitration Statutes, 
in REINSURANCE LAW REPORT 11, 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.sidley.com/files/News/34c2903f-51e3-437a-8958-
4ce663822f27/Presentation/NewsAttachment/17336d71-1845-4bab-93b9-55f524ff523b/2009-RLR-
COLOR-4-30-09.pdf (“At least twenty states and two U.S. territories prohibit the arbitration of 
insurance disputes.”). 
 19. See infra Part IV (going through the legal issues that must be dealt with over the course of 
resolving the issue of whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act preempts the New York Convention). 
 20. See infra Part IV.A (describing several outcomes in lower courts and explaining that they 
are largely unpublished and lack precedential value). 
 21. See Brief for Petitioner at 25, La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010) (No. 09-945) (stating that the 
decisions of the lower court are almost never subject to appeal). 
 22. See infra Part III.B (describing the two opinions of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals and 
the split they have created). 
 23. See infra Part IV (proposing a systematic analysis courts should employ when dealing with 
this issue). 
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York Convention by the McCarran–Ferguson Act.  Part II.E recounts the 
history of the treaty power, and concludes that Congress could not have 
intended for the McCarran–Ferguson Act to preempt the New York 
Convention.  Part II.F briefly describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
enunciation of a federal policy favoring arbitration of international disputes. 
In Part III, this Article describes the case law that has arisen from the 
clash between the McCarran–Ferguson Act and the New York Convention.  
Part III.A describes the difficulty of application of the law in the lower 
courts.  Part III.B walks through the opinions of the Second and Fifth 
Circuits on this issue.  Part III.C explains why the case law up to this point 
has been insufficient and has skipped the stronger and more fundamental 
arguments in favor of problematic and erroneous ones. 
Part IV offers a framework that courts should utilize when encountering 
this issue in the future.  Part IV goes step-by-step through the analysis a 
court should employ when facing this issue, and shows how the law 
described in Part II can be used to resolve the issue in favor of compelling 
arbitration.  Part V concludes this Article. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Part delineates the law that serves as a backdrop for the issues that 
arise when a court is faced with deciding whether the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act can reverse preempt the New York Convention. 
A. The McCarran–Ferguson Act 
The McCarran–Ferguson Act’s history dates back to over seventy-five 
years before its enactment.24  Because the McCarran–Ferguson Act 
effectively turned back time when it was enacted,25 it is vital to understand 
its history in order to understand the operation of the Act.  Sections 1 and 2 
of this subpart describe that history.  Section 3 describes the act itself, its 
effect, and the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that have determined 
how it functions. 
 
 24. See infra notes 46–54 and accompanying text (delineating the roots of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act, beginning in the mid-1800s). 
 25. See infra Part II.A.3 (describing how the McCarran–Ferguson Act reversed a decision of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in order to restore the regulation of insurance to earlier conditions). 
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1. Paul v. Virginia26 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, state regulation of 
the insurance industry was becoming increasingly restrictive.27  A fire 
insurance “industry committee” reported in 1850 that the industry as a whole 
had sustained such great losses from 1831 to 1850 that there was a net loss 
for “the entire period from 1791 to 1850.”28  Insurance companies wished to 
turn to the federal government for relief, expecting more forgiving 
legislation from Congress.29  First, however, the insurance companies 
needed a favorable ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court holding that the state 
legislation was unconstitutional.30  Among the offending pieces of state 
 
 26. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (deciding that insurance does not constitute interstate 
commerce). 
 27. See Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s Commerce 
Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 258 (2000) (describing state insurance laws as 
“aggressive”); Peter R. Nehemkis, Jr., Paul v. Virginia: The Need for Re-Examination, 27 GEO. L.J. 
519, 523–25 (1939) (recounting how between the 1820s and the 1860s, numerous states had enacted 
laws that aggressively restricted and taxed the insurance industry).  Nehemkis provides a fascinating 
and comprehensive account of the history leading up to Paul v. Virginia, which this Article more 
briefly addresses.  See id. at 519–28 (describing the historical context of Paul v. Virginia).  Other 
sources focus on the protectionist nature of the offending state legislation.  See David J. Howard, 
Uncle Sam Versus the Insurance Commissioners: A Multi-Level Approach to Defining the ‘Business 
of Insurance’ Under the McCarran–Ferguson Act, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 20 (1989) (“With 
respect to taxation and licensure, foreign companies were discriminated against for the dual purpose 
of protecting local policyholders and increasing state revenues.”); LEE R. RUSS ET AL., COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 2:4 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the state legislation as discriminatory “in favor of 
domestic insurers”). 
 28. Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate 
Regulation: The McCarran–Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 548 
(1958) (“An industry committee reporting in 1850 alleged that . . . during the years from 1831 to 
1850 the entire business was carried on at a great loss of capital.  The committee said there was a 
loss for the entire period from 1791 to 1850.”).  Kimball & Boyce are not certain of the accuracy of 
these statistics, but the information is nonetheless valuable as evidence of the insurance industry’s 
perception.  Id. (“Whether these statements were accurate or not, they represented industry belief, 
and explain the insurance fraternity’s attitude . . . .”).  Kimball & Boyce describe the legal and 
economic status of the insurance industry during the nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century in great detail.  See generally id. 
 29. See Guenter, supra note 27, at 258 (“The insurance companies had in mind legislation 
modeled after the National Bank Act that would offer them the sanctuary of a federal charter.”); 
Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 525 (“The passage of the National banking Act of 1864 had suggested 
to the insurance companies the possibility of extending federal control to the insurance business.  
And in the next year the companies addressed a Memorial to Congress asking for relief from the 
burdens of excessive supervision and legislation.”). 
 30. See Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 525–26 (stating that in 1868, the Committee on 
Legislation and Taxation of the National Board of Fire Underwriters called for a test case in order to 
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legislation was an 1866 Virginia statute that required all non-Virginia 
insurers and their local agents to post a $30,000–$50,000 bond before 
engaging in business within the state.31  This legislation would provide the 
basis for a test case brought by the insurers to challenge the constitutionality 
of state regulation of the insurance industry.32 
To manufacture the basis for the case, a Virginia resident named Samuel 
B. Paul was made an agent of the Germania Fire Insurance Company, 
Hanover Fire Insurance Company, Niagara Fire Insurance Company, and 
Republic Insurance Company, all of which were New York corporations.33  
Paul applied for a license to act as an agent in Virginia,34 but refused to post 
the required bond, ostensibly based on instructions from his employers.35  
His license was then denied,36 but he nonetheless issued policies in Virginia, 
 
secure a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that restrictive state insurance legislation was 
unconstitutional). 
 31. See Guenter, supra note 27, at 258 (describing the “Virginia statutory scheme” as 
requiring “out-of-state insurance companies to obtain a license” which depended upon “the out-of-
state insurer depositing bonds,” and making it a “violation of the law to act as an agent for an 
unlicensed out-of-state” insurer); Howard, supra note 27, at 21 (“A Virginia statute provided that no 
foreign insurer or its local agent could transact business in Virginia unless the insurer posted a bond 
in an amount ranging from $30,000 to $50,000.”); Spencer L. Kimball & Barbara P. Heaney, 
Emasculation of the McCarran–Ferguson Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 
(1985) (“In 1866 the Virginia legislature enacted two related statutes . . . .  One prohibited a foreign 
(non-Virginia) insurance company from doing insurance business in Virginia unless it first acquired 
a license, for which it needed to deposit bonds . . . .  The second forbade an agent to act for a foreign 
insurance company unless licensed as an agent.”); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 526 (“Virginia was 
among the states which had exacted a deposit of the state’s bonds as a condition precedent to the 
right to do business within the State.”). 
 32. See Guenter, supra note 27, at 258 (describing how Paul v. Virginia was a test case based 
on an intentional violation of the Virginia legislation); Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 3–4 
(explaining that the Virginia legislation was violated in order to create the underlying controversy in 
Paul v. Virginia); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 526 (“[T]he Virginia statute had been selected [by the 
insurance companies] for constitutional determination . . . .”). 
 33. Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527 (“In May, 1866, Paul, a resident of Virginia, was 
appointed agent to carry on the general business of fire insurance for Germania Fire Insurance 
Company, Hanover Fire Insurance Company, Niagara Fire Insurance Company, and the Republic 
Insurance Company, all incorporated in the State of New York.”). 
 34. Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 4 (“Paul applied for a license to represent unadmitted 
New York insurance companies as agent . . . .”); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527 (“[Paul] applied to 
the proper officer of the district for a license to act as such agent within the State . . . .”). 
 35. Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527 (“[Paul] declined (it may be presumed upon instructions 
from his home offices) to comply with the provisions requiring a deposit of bonds with the treasurer 
of the State.”); Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 4 (“Paul . . . offer[ed] to comply with all the 
state’s requirements except the deposit of the required securities.”). 
 36. Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527 (“His license was refused.”); Kimball & Heaney, supra 
note 31, at 4 (“The license was refused.”). 
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for which he was convicted and fined.37  The Supreme Court of Virginia 
affirmed Paul’s conviction,38 and the case proceeded to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.39  Thanks to the support of the National Board of Fire Underwriters,40 
Paul was represented by, “perhaps, the two most distinguished members of 
the bar of the day”41: Benjamin Curtis,42 a former Associate Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court,43 and James Mandeville Carlisle,44 who argued more 
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Claims than any other 
attorney from 1863–1873.45 
Despite the competence of Paul’s counsel, Paul v. Virginia was a 
stunning failure as a test case for the insurance industry.  In order to cure the 
insurers of the offending state legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court would 
have had to determine that “the states were without power to regulate with 
 
 37. Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 4(“Paul nevertheless issued a policy as agent for one 
of the New York companies; he was indicted, convicted and fined fifty dollars.”); Nehemkis, supra 
note 27, at 527 (“So that the issue might be clearly framed, Paul issued a policy of insurance to a 
citizen of Virginia without the required license.  He was promptly indicted and convicted in the 
Circuit Court of the city of Petersburg, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50.”). 
 38. JOHN G. DAY, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1970) 
(“[T]he Virginia Supreme Court had affirmed the conviction . . . .”); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 
527 (“On error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia the judgment below was 
affirmed . . . .”). 
 39. Howard, supra note 27, at 21 (“After his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, Paul appealed to the United States Supreme Court . . . .”); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527 
(“[T]he case was brought on to the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 40. See DAY, supra note 38, at 14 (stating that the National Board of Fire Underwriters had 
undertaken to provide moral and material support for Paul); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 526–27 
(stating that the National Board of Fire Underwriters had been advised of the case after it had 
advanced from the Supreme Court of Virginia, and had undertaken to provide support and secure 
counsel for Paul). 
 41. Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 527. 
 42. See id. at 527–28 (stating that Curtis was appointed Paul’s legal counsel). 
 43. See id. at 527–28 (stating that “Benjamin R. Curtis . . . had resigned as Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court in March, 1857”).  Curtis had resigned from the U.S. Supreme Court because his 
pay was insufficient to maintain his and his family’s lifestyle and because of the makeup of the 
Court.  See id. at 528 n.38 (recounting a letter from Curtis to President Fillmore in which he cited the 
inadequacy of his pay and the state of the Court as his reasons for resigning).  “Curtis soon became 
the principal legal spokesman for the ‘vested interests’ and, in particular, the insurance companies.”  
Id. 
 44. See id. at 527–28 (stating that James Mandeville Carlisle was also Paul’s counsel in Paul 
v. Virginia). 
 45. See id. at 528 n.39 (“On the reorganization of the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia in 1863 [Carlisle] . . . confined his practice to the Supreme Court of the United States and 
the Court of Claims where for the next ten years he held a larger number of briefs than any other 
practitioner.”). 
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respect to the activities of foreign insurance companies.”46  Paul advanced 
the argument that because the Virginia statute governed commerce between 
Virginia and other states, it violated Congress’s constitutionally delegated 
Commerce Clause authority.47 
Justice Field, writing for a unanimous Court,48 rejected this argument.  
He squarely rejected the idea that the Commerce Clause would govern this 
case, deciding that the issuance of an insurance policy is simply not 
commerce.49  Instead, Justice Field explained, they are simply personal 
contracts that do not involve the shipment of goods across borders,50 but are 
executed in one state, despite the fact that the two parties may be domiciled 
in different states.51  Hence, Justice Field decided, a contract for a policy of 
insurance, even when it involves out-of-state insurers, is not interstate 
commerce “any more than a contract for the purchase and sale of goods in 
Virginia by a citizen of New York whilst in Virginia would constitute a 
portion of such commerce.”52  Though Justice Field’s decision may have 
“seemed almost as unrealistic in 1869 as it does today,”53 it was nevertheless 
 
 46. Id. at 528 (“[I]n granting relief the Court must so determine the issues as to make 
possible . . . the program debated in the halls of the insurance conventions . . . .  This meant, in 
effect, that the Court must determine that the states were without power to regulate with respect to 
the activities of foreign insurance companies.”). 
 47. See id. at 528–29 (“Counsel for Paul in substance advanced [the argument that] . . . as the 
statute in question was an attempt to regulate commerce between Virginia and other states of the 
Union, it encroached upon a subject which was exclusively within the province of Congress: it was 
not a subject, therefore, upon which the states could legislate in the absence of legislation by 
Congress.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”  
 48. Howard, supra note 27, at 21 (“Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed 
Paul’s conviction . . . .”); Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 529 (“Mr. Justice Field, speaking for a 
unanimous Court . . . .”). 
 49. Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 532 (“The defect of the argument lies in the character of their 
business.  Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”). 
 50. Id. (“They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and 
then put up for sale.  They are like other personal contracts between parties which are completed by 
their signature and the transfer of consideration.”). 
 51. Id. at 533 (“Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though the parties may be 
domiciled in different states.  The policies do not take effect—are not executed contracts—until 
delivered by the agent in Virginia.”). 
 52. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). 
 53. Howard, supra note 27, at 21.  See also Nehemkis, supra note 27, at 533 (“However 
unrealistic was Field’s conception of the nature of insurance—as unrealistic then as now—his classic 
commentary is understandable in the light of the practical exigencies of government.”).  Nehemkis 
goes on to explain that Field probably adopted such an “unrealistic” position because no federal 
regulation had been passed.  See id.  Thus, Nehemkis suggests, Justice Field was likely concerned 
about the possibility of the entire insurance industry going unregulated while Congress scrambled to 
pass legislation.  See id. (“It must be remembered that the Court was not construing an act of 
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controlling law for the intervening seventy-five years, withstanding at least 
twelve attempts to have it overruled in the U.S. Supreme Court.54 
2. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n55 
In 1944, three-quarters of a century of undiminished certainty that 
insurance was not interstate commerce suddenly ended when the U.S. 
 
Congress; it had before it a state statute.  Therefore, a determination that insurance was a business in 
interstate commerce would have been tantamount to creating a governmental vacuum . . . .”). 
 54. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 432 (1935) (“But insurance is not commerce; and the 
right of a citizen to take out a policy in one state, insuring property in another where he resides, 
cannot be protected under the commerce clause.”); Bothwell v. Buckbee-Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 
276–77 (1927) (“A contract of insurance, although made with a corporation having its office in a 
state other than that in which the insured resides and in which the interest insured is located, is not 
interstate commerce . . . .”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71, 75 (1922) (citing 
Paul v. Virginia for the proposition that “the business of such insurance companies is purely 
intrastate . . . [and] the state has power to require them to accept conditions different from those 
imposed on domestic corporations”); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 138 (1918) 
(“That the tax upon the life insurance business, which is the subject-matter of the license tax here 
involved, is not a tax upon interstate commerce is established . . . .”); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer 
Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1913) (extending Paul v. Virginia to life insurance); N.Y. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 401 (1900) (“That the business of fire insurance is not interstate 
commerce is decided in Paul v. Virginia . . . .”); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 653 (1895) 
(“That the business of insurance does not generically appertain to [the Commerce Clause] has been 
well settled since the case of Paul v. Virginia.”); Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 
117–20 (1886) (declining to overturn Paul v. Virginia); Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U.S. 727, 
732 (1885) (“The right of the people of a state to prescribe generally by its constitution and laws the 
terms upon which a foreign corporation shall be allowed to carry on its business in the state, has 
been settled by [Paul v. Virginia].”); Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 539 (1876) (declining to 
distinguish Paul v. Virginia); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77 U.S. 566, 573–76 (1870) 
(extending Paul v. Virginia to cover foreign insurers); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410, 415 (1870) 
(“[T]he decision in [Paul v. Virginia] . . . has already disposed of all the principal questions 
involved.”).  See also Guenter, supra note 27, at 529 (“Between 1869 and 1927, the Supreme Court 
rendered ten decisions determining that various types of insurance or insurance-related activities 
were not interstate commerce, upholding in each case a form of state taxation or regulation that 
presumably would not have passed constitutional muster if applied to a business that did not 
constitute interstate commerce.”); Howard, supra note 27, at 21 (“[Paul v. Virginia] controlled 
application of the Commerce Clause to the insurance industry for the next seventy-five years despite 
repeated efforts to have it overruled.”).  Paul v. Virginia’s ruling that corporations were not citizens 
for purposes of the Commerce Clause has never been overturned.  See George F. Carpinello, State 
Protective Legislation and Nonresident Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a 
Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73 IOWA L. REV. 351, 352 (1988) (stating that the Commerce Clause 
“never has been held applicable to corporations”).  Carpinello gives a detailed analysis of why Paul 
v. Virginia remains law in this regard to this day.  See generally id. 
 55. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (deciding that 
insurance is interstate commerce). 
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Supreme Court decided United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n 
(SEUA).56  The underlying issue in SEUA arose from the existence of federal 
antitrust legislation, which numerous insurance companies had violated—
but only if the antitrust legislation in fact governed insurers.57 
Such were the circumstances in 1942 when approximately 200 insurance 
companies were charged with violating federal antitrust legislation by a 
federal grand jury in Atlanta, Georgia.58  Since Paul v. Virginia and its 
progeny were still controlling case law, the “lower Federal Court, acting 
upon the line of United States Supreme Court decisions holding that 
insurance is not commerce, declined to hear the case on its merits and as a 
result the question whether insurance was or was not commerce was directly 
presented to the United States Supreme Court.”59  In a decision that made 
“insurance men [think] the end of the world was come,”60 the Court held that 
insurance was interstate commerce, and reversed the lower court’s dismissal 
of the indictments.61  The SEUA Court’s rationale was exceedingly simple: 
Every other commercial activity that takes place in interstate commerce had 
been held within Congress’s power to legislate, and there was no reason to 
except insurance from that rule.62 
 
 56. Howard, supra note 27, at 23 (“The long era of Paul v. Virginia came to an abrupt end in 
1944 when the Supreme Court decided United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association . . . .”).  See also Guenter, supra note 27, at 286 (“SEUA is one of the Supreme Court’s 
most celebrated reversals of an established precedent.”). 
 57. See Howard, supra note 27, at 23 (“Following the decision in Paul v. Virginia, Congress 
had passed antitrust legislation . . . .  Thus, while Paul dealt with the question of whether there 
should be state regulation or no regulation over insurance, the issue in SEUA was whether federal 
antitrust laws, rather than state insurance laws, should govern monopolistic behavior . . . .”).  To 
make the issue more problematic, the nature of insurance companies to conduct their business across 
multiple states, combined with the jurisdictional confines of state regulation, rendered the states 
unable to effectively regulate anticompetitive practices.  See DAY, supra note 38, at 22–23 (“The 
interstate character of most insurers’ business and jurisdictional limits on individual state regulator’s 
authority compounded the problem.  [State Attorneys General were] [r]educed to impotence by these 
circumstances . . . .”). 
 58. Howard, supra note 27, at 23 (“In 1942, a federal grand jury in Atlanta, Georgia indicted 
nearly 200 insurance companies, charging them with . . . conspiring to fix and maintain arbitrary and 
non-competitive rates on fire insurance policies . . . and . . . conspiring to monopolize trade and 
commerce in the fire insurance sold . . . .”). 
 59. Joseph B. Beach, The South-Eastern Underwriters’ Decision and Its Effect, 1947 WIS. L. 
REV. 321, 322 (1947). 
 60. Kimball & Boyce, supra note 28, at 554.  See also Charles D. Weller, The McCarran–
Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 
587, 590 (1978) (“The Court’s ruling generated a flood of often torrid commentary.”).  
 61. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553, 562 (holding 
that insurance was interstate commerce and reversing the lower court). 
 62. Id. at 553 (“No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state 
lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause.  We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance.”).  See also Beach, supra note 
10
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The SEUA decision alarmed the state commissioners of insurance as 
well as the insurance industry.63  Not only did the opinion “threaten[] to 
wreak havoc on the insurance industry”64 itself, but it also threatened to put 
state insurance commissioners out of a job and deny the states of substantial 
tax revenue.65  With these concerns in mind, the insurance industry and state 
actors began to pressure Congress to enact legislation that would preserve 
the states’ power to regulate insurance.66 
Congress recognized the knotty position in which SEUA had left the 
insurance industry and insurance industry regulators, and was receptive to 
suggestions.67  The state insurance commissioners, under the auspices of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), proposed a bill 
that preserved the states’ authority to regulate and tax the insurance industry, 
while preserving some measure of applicability of federal antitrust 
legislation to insurance companies.68  In the third session of Congress 
 
59, at 322 (“The decision is very clear on the point that insurance is commerce and, insofar as 
transactions which cross state lines are concerned, interstate commerce.”). 
 63. Beach, supra note 59, at 322 (“The South-Eastern Underwriters decision created 
consternation both in the business of insurance and among the state commissioners of insurance.”).  
See also Weller, supra note 60, at 590 (“The first contention was that of [some] in the fire insurance 
industry who felt the threat of criminal prosecution most immediately. . . .  Second, there was serious 
concern that state tax and regulatory schemes would now be found unconstitutional under the 
commerce clause.”).  But see Kimball & Boyce, supra note 28, at 554 (“[The fear of danger to state 
insurance regulation] was exaggerated, as the subsequent [cases] demonstrated.”).  
 64. Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 9. 
 65. See id. (“It threatened to put state regulators of insurance out of business.  It also 
threatened to withdraw from the states considerable revenues from franchise taxes.”).  
 66. Id. (“The insurance industry and the state regulators importuned Congress to act to 
alleviate those threats.”).  See also Beach, supra note 59, at 323 (“At this point the insurance 
industry and the state commissioners of insurance began to work together to plan measures to cope 
with the situation.”). 
 67. Beach, supra note 59, at 323 (“Congress also realized that the business of insurance and 
the regulation of that business by the states had been placed under a severe handicap by the South-
Eastern Underwriters decision and was ready and willing to entertain reasonable proposals.”).  
 68. Guenter, supra note 27, at 291 (“The NAIC’s primary interest was to restore to the states 
the right to regulate the day-to-day activities of the insurance industry and to tax its interstate 
operations as they had prior to the SEUA case . . . .  [However,] it favored the application of the 
[federal antitrust legislation] . . . .”). 
11
Wells: When "Yes" Means "No": McCarran-Ferguson, the New York Convention
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2012
 278 
following SEUA,69 on March 9, 1945,70 a revised version of the NAIC 
proposal was enacted as the McCarran–Ferguson Act.71 
3. The Act and Its Contours 
The McCarran–Ferguson Act provides, in pertinent part: 
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted 
by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a 
fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of 
insurance . . . .72 
The only issue on which commentators and courts agree regarding the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act is that it was intended to reverse SEUA.73  
McCarran–Ferguson instantly became the subject of a great deal of 
litigation; the first challenge under the McCarran–Ferguson Act to make it to 
the U.S. Supreme Court—less than a year after the Act was passed—was, 
unsurprisingly, an attack on the constitutionality of the Act itself.74 
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Benjamin,75 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the Act did not violate the Commerce Clause, and Congress 
could constitutionally allow the states to regulate interstate commercial 
insurance transactions.76  Prudential involved a strikingly similar factual 
 
 69. Id. at 290 (“Legislation dealing with the issues raised by the SEUA litigation was 
considered in three sessions of Congress before the Act became law.”). 
 70. Beach, supra note 59, at 323 (“[T]he McCarran Act . . . was adopted by Congress on 
March 9, 1945.”). 
 71. See Kimball & Heaney, supra note 31, at 9 (“The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (or “NAIC”) draft bill, with only modest changes, became the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act.”).  See also Guenter, supra note 27, at 292 (“[T]he provisions of the act, other than those that 
relate to the applicability of the federal antitrust laws to insurance, are almost identical to legislation 
proposed by the NAIC.”); Weller, supra note 60, at 598 (“The NAIC origins of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act are unmistakable . . . .”). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). 
 73. Guenter, supra note 27, at 295 (“Perhaps the only matter about which decisions 
interpreting the Act and commentators are unanimous is that the Act was an attempt to undo the 
result of SEUA . . . .”). 
 74. See infra notes 75–88 and accompanying text (describing the 1946 U.S. Supreme Court 
case that rejected an attack on the constitutionality of the McCarran–Ferguson Act). 
 75. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (upholding the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act against a Commerce Clause challenge). 
 76. Howard, supra note 27, at 34 (“The Court held that the Commerce Clause did not prevent 
Congress from allowing the states to control interstate insurance transactions in areas where 
Congress had not spoken, and even in areas where it had spoken but its words did not specifically 
relate to the business of insurance.”). 
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scenario to that in Paul v. Virginia:77 An insurance company was 
challenging a state tax on out-of-state insurers as unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.78  Prudential’s constitutional attack on McCarran–
Ferguson was, in effect, that Congress could not allow any burden on 
interstate commerce through its acquiescence to the states’ power to regulate 
that would be an unconstitutional burden under the Commerce Clause if 
Congress had not legislated at all.79  The Court completely rejected this 
argument.80  The Court explained that its most relevant precedents were 
those in which Congress’s silence on a particular matter had been interpreted 
as invalidating state action, but Congress had subsequently reversed the 
invalidation through legislation.81  In none of those cases had the Court 
struck down such legislation.82  While the Court conceded that 
“rationalizations [had] differed concerning those decisions,”83 it nonetheless 
concluded that “the results have been lasting and are at least as important, 
for the direction given to the process of accommodating federal and state 
authority, as the reasons stated for reaching them.”84  Prudential offers some 
revealing guidance as to Congress’s assent to the states’ authority over the 
insurance industry: “Congress intended to declare, and in effect declared, 
that uniformity of regulation, and of state taxation, are not required in 
 
 77. Prudential, 328 U.S. at 410 (“In cycle reminiscent conversely of views advanced . . . in 
Paul v. Virginia, claims are put forward on the basis of the South-eastern decision to sustain 
immunity from state taxation . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. See id. (“The specific effect asserted in this case is that South Carolina no longer can 
collect taxes from Prudential, a New Jersey corporation . . . .  The tax is laid on foreign insurance 
companies and must be paid annually as a condition of . . . carry[ing] on the business of insurance 
within the state.”). 
 79. See id. at 422 (“[Prudential’s argument is] that neither Congress acting affirmatively nor 
Congress and the states thus acting coordinately can validly impose any regulation which the Court 
has found or would find to be forbidden by the commerce clause, if laid only by state action taken 
while Congress’ power lies dormant.”). 
 80. See id. (“Merely to state the position in this way compels its rejection.”). 
 81. See id. at 423–24 (stating that “the cases most important for the decision in this cause” are 
those “where the silence of Congress or the dormancy of its power has been taken judicially . . . as 
forbidding state action, only to have Congress later disclaim the prohibition or undertake to nullify 
it”). 
 82. Id. at 424 (“Not yet has this Court held such a disclaimer invalid or that state action 
supported by it could not stand.  On the contrary in each instance it has given effect to the 
Congressional judgment contradicting its own previous one.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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reference to the business of insurance, by the national public interest, except 
in the specific respects otherwise expressly provided for.”85 
Naturally, the Court observed, Congress was aware of the existence of 
state regulations and taxes on the insurance industry,86 and that those 
regulations and taxes were different from state to state and different from 
regulations and taxes on other industries.87  Thus, “Congress[‘s] . . . purpose 
was evidently to throw the whole weight of its power behind the state 
systems, notwithstanding these variations.”88 
Subsequent to the Prudential decision, the U.S. Supreme Court gave 
further clarification as to the contours of McCarran–Ferguson reverse 
preemption.  In State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,89 the 
Court stated, after reviewing the legislative history of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act,90 that the Act could not reverse the effect of prior non-
Commerce Clause U.S. Supreme Court decisions, whether rightly or 
wrongly decided.91  The Todd Shipyards opinion was extended by Western 
& Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization of 
California,92 which relied on the proposition that while states could impede 
Commerce Clause restrictions by virtue of the McCarran–Ferguson Act, 
states could not impede Equal Protection restrictions.93  This line of 
decisions was extended once again by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,94 and much more boldly.  The 
Ward Court stated that “as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative 
history of the McCarran–Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress’ 
response only to [SEUA], and that Congress did not intend thereby to give 
the States any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than 
 
 85. Id. at 431. 
 86. See id. at 430 (“Congress must have had full knowledge of the nation-wide existence of 
state systems of regulation and taxation . . . .”). 
 87. See id. (“Congress must have had full knowledge . . . of the fact that they differ greatly in 
the scope and character of the regulations imposed and of the taxes exacted; and . . . that many . . . 
include features which, to some extent, have not been applied generally to other interstate 
business.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962) (ruling that the McCarran–
Ferguson Act could not reverse the effect of non-Commerce Clause pre-SEUA decisions). 
 90. See id. at 455–56 (reviewing the legislative history of the McCarran–Ferguson Act). 
 91. See id. at 456 (deciding that several Due Process U.S. Supreme Court cases remained good 
law in restricting the business of insurance). 
 92. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648 (1981). 
 93. See id. at 656 (“This case assumes an unusual posture, however, because the Commerce 
Clause is inapplicable to the business of insurance [by virtue of the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act] . . . and the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to corporations . . . .  Only the 
Equal Protection Clause remains as a possible ground for invalidation of the California tax.”).  
 94. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). 
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what they had previously possessed.”95  It would therefore appear that the 
Court has demonstrated its reading of McCarran–Ferguson as impeding only 
Commerce Clause limitations on state regulation of the insurance industry. 
As the text of the McCarran–Ferguson Act and a long line of U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent indicates, there are three prerequisites for a state 
statute to reverse preempt federal law under the Act.96  First, there must be a 
federal statute of general applicability, meaning one that does not 
specifically concern the insurance industry.97  Second, there must be a “state 
law ‘enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance.’”98  
Third, McCarran–Ferguson can only preempt the federal law if the “federal 
measure . . . would ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ the State’s law.”99  One 
question this framework has raised that has attracted a great amount of 
attention is how to define “business of insurance.”  The most recent and 
clear case on this issue, Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,100 gave a 
framework for determining what falls under the definition of “business of 
insurance” as it is used in another part of the McCarran–Ferguson Act.101  
Pireno’s framework, a partial restatement of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent,102 employs three factors for identifying what activity is the 
“business of insurance”: “[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of 
transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice 
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the 
insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the 
 
 95. Id. at 880 n.8 (internal citations omitted). 
 96. See RUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at § 4:7 (“Three conditions must be present before the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act precludes the application of federal law . . . .”). 
 97. See, e.g., Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307 (“The McCarran–Ferguson Act thus 
precludes application of a federal statute . . . if the federal measure does not ‘specifically relat[e] to 
the business of insurance’ . . . .”).  See also RUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at § 4:7 (“(1) the federal 
statute at issue must be a ‘general’ statute that does not specifically relate to the ‘business of 
insurance’ . . . .”). 
 98. Forsyth, 525 U.S. at 307.  See also RUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at § 4:7 (“(2) the state 
statute at issue was enacted for the purpose of regulating the ‘business of insurance’ . . . .”).  
 99. Forsyth, 525 U.S. at 307.  See also RUSS ET AL., supra note 27, at 4:7 (“(3) application of 
the federal statute would ‘invalidate, impair or supercede’ the state statute.”). 
 100. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982). 
 101. See id. at 124–25 (describing this case as involving an antitrust issue and delineating the 
framework for the part of the McCarran–Ferguson Act that deals with antitrust legislation). 
 102. Id. at 126 (“In [a prior case], this Court had occasion to reexamine the scope of the express 
antitrust exemption provided for the ‘business of insurance’ by § 2(b) of the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act.  We hold that decision of the question before us is controlled by [that decision].”). 
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insurance industry.”103  The Court carefully noted, however, that “[n]one of 
these criteria is necessarily determinative in itself.”104 
There is an additional twist in analyzing the “business of insurance” 
under the part of the McCarran–Ferguson Act, however.  In United States 
Department of Treasury v. Fabe,105 the Court stated that the first clause of § 
2(b) of the McCarran–Ferguson Act, which is relevant to this Article, 
encompasses a broader swath when it uses the term “business of insurance” 
than does the antitrust clause, because “[t]he broad category of laws enacted 
‘for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance’ consists of laws that 
possess the ‘end, intention, or aim’ of adjusting, managing, or controlling the 
business of insurance.  This category necessarily encompasses more than 
just the ‘business of insurance.’”106  Fabe’s “clarification” of the Pireno 
framework’s application to the first clause of § 2(b) of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act has resulted in a great deal of confusion.107  Lower courts have 
not agreed on how the Pireno test should be used in this context.108  One 
commentator has suggested using the Pireno test as a starting point, but not 
as a complete test.109  While consensus on this issue seems fleeting, what 
remains certain is that a first clause inquiry under Fabe will be at least as 
inclusive as the Pireno test.110 
 
 103. Id. at 129. 
 104. Id. 
 105. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993). 
 106. Id. at 505 (internal citations omitted). 
 107. Peter B. Steffen, Comment, After Fabe: Applying the Pireno Definition of “Business of 
Insurance” in First-Clause McCarran–Ferguson Act Cases, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 463 
(“Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts, Fabe did not put an end to confusion over the definition of 
‘business of insurance.’”). 
 108. Compare, e.g., Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of 
Columbus, 846 F. Supp. 454, 459 (D.S.C. 1994) (“Initially, the Court notes that neither National 
Casualty nor the Pireno criteria are controlling. . . .  In Fabe, the Supreme Court recognized the 
distinction between cases which involve the scope of the antitrust exemption in the second clause of 
Section 2(b), and cases which fall within the first clause . . . .”), with Merchs. Home Delivery Serv., 
Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1490 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In Fabe, the Supreme Court 
actually applied the three [Pireno] factors . . . .  On the other hand, . . . the Court held the business of 
insurance was to be defined more broadly. . . .  This is a matter of degree, however, rather than a 
wholesale change in the inquiry.”).  See also Steffen, supra note 107, at 463 (“The question 
troubling lower courts in the wake of Fabe is whether they should completely disregard the Pireno 
test in first-clause cases.”). 
 109. Steffan, supra note 107, at 471 (“Courts should recognize that Pireno can be helpful in 
first-clause noon-antitrust cases, but that it is only a starting point. . . .  The Pireno test should not be 
definitive in first-clause cases.”). 
 110. Id. at 463 (“Those lower courts that apply Pireno in first-clause cases must also decide 
whether a broader application of ‘business of insurance’ is necessary outside of the antitrust 
context. . . .  Courts that reject the Pireno test in first-clause cases effectively choose a more 
inclusive approach.”). 
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Courts charged with deciding whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act 
reverse preempts the New York Convention in favor of state legislation that 
declares arbitration agreements in insurance contracts unenforceable have 
almost all determined that the state statutes do regulate the “business of 
insurance.”111  As the law currently stands, this conclusion is almost 
certainly correct.  A statute declaring international arbitration agreements in 
insurance contracts unenforceable is, by definition, regulating a “practice 
limited to entities within the insurance industry.”112  Moreover, international 
arbitration agreements are, to a great extent, “an integral part of the policy 
relationship between the insurer and the insured,”113 because such 
agreements necessarily determine how conflicts within that relationship will 
be resolved.  This is, perhaps, the defining factor in the contractual policy 
relationship, because the contractual guarantees are only as certain as a 
tribunal deems them to be under the governing law.114  Therefore, even 
under the Pireno test alone, such statutes govern the “business of 
 
 111. Nat’l Home Ins. Co. v. King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 530 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“[B]oth federal 
and state courts have held that state statutes that invalidate arbitration clauses specifically as to 
insurance contracts are indeed ‘enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance’ . . . .  
[B]ased upon the above authorities, the McCarran–Ferguson Act does ‘reverse preempt’ . . . .”); 
Transit Cas. Co. in Receivership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, No. 96–4173–CV–
C–2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996) (“In addition, the court finds that [the 
statute] was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance in that the statute is 
‘aimed at protecting or regulating the performance of an insurance contract.’ (quoting U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 505 (1993))).  Only two courts have determined that such statutes 
are not statutes regulating the “business of insurance.”  Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr., Inc., 52 
F. Supp. 2d 699, 706 n.20 (M.D. La. 1999) (“While the McCarran–Ferguson Act prohibits 
preemption of a state’s insurance regulation, a dispute between an insurer and its insured regarding 
terms of their contract is not ‘the business of insurance.’”); Triton Lines, Inc. v. S.S. Mut. 
Underwriting Ass’n, 707 F. Supp. 277, 279 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (“A disputed claim is not the business 
of insurance.  The business of regulating the insurance industry focuses on the underwriting and 
spreading of the policyholder’s risk.”). 
 112. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (stating that the third factor in deciding 
whether a statute regulates “the business of insurance” is whether the statute institutes a “practice 
limited to entities within the insurance industry”). 
 113. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (stating that the second factor in deciding 
whether a statute regulates “the business of insurance” is whether the statute deals with “an integral 
part of the policy relationship between the insurer and insured”). 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty.”). 
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insurance.”115  With the broader net that Fabe casts,116 and with the certainty 
that statutes prohibiting the enforcement of international arbitration 
agreements in insurance contracts at least “possess the ‘end, intention, or 
aim’ of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of insurance,”117 
such statutes clearly regulate the “business of insurance.” 
B. The New York Convention 
The New York Convention, hailed as the “most important international 
treaty relating to international commercial arbitration”118 and the 
“centerpiece of the legal regime governing international arbitration 
agreements,”119 embodied a change in the tides among the nations and courts 
of the world from a prejudice against the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements to a prejudice in favor of the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.120  Indeed, the New York Convention is credited with being 
chiefly responsible for the rapid increase in the employment and 
effectiveness of arbitration agreements in the years since its inception.121  
This subpart describes the New York Convention and its implementing 
legislation.  Section 1 describes the history and effect of the New York 
 
 115. See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text (delineating the Pireno test and 
establishing that test as the first iteration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s formula for defining the 
“business of insurance”). 
 116. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text (describing the broader Fabe test). 
 117. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (stating that regulations “enacted ‘for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance’ consists of laws that possess the ‘end, intention, or 
aim’ of adjusting, managing, or controlling the business of insurance” are included within the Fabe 
test). 
 118. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 81 (4th ed. 2004). 
 119. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: 
DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 123 (3d. ed. 2010). 
 120. See Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1961) 
(describing how “[f]rom the days of the early English ‘piepowder’ courts, where merchants with the 
dust of the market still on their feet stepped into a tribunal of merchants for swift resolution of their 
disputes,” courts and law were hostile to arbitration agreements); MARGARET L. MOSES, THE 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3 (2008) (“The New 
York Convention is considered to have a pro-enforcement bias, and most courts will interpret the 
permissible grounds for non-enforcement quite narrowly, leading to the enforcement of the vast 
majority of awards.”). 
 121. BORN, supra note 119, at 123 (“[The New York Convention] is widely regarded as having 
contributed to the significant increase in the use and efficacy of international commercial arbitration 
in recent decades.”); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 118, at 81 (“Indeed, [the New York 
Convention] may be regarded as a major factor in the development of arbitration as a means of 
resolving international trade disputes.”). 
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Convention.  Section 2 delineates the New York Convention’s domestic 
implementing legislation and its operation. 
1. The Convention 
Within a short time after the establishment of the United Nations, 
international actors sought to create a mechanism for enforcing foreign 
arbitral awards under the auspices of the transnational body.122  In 1953, the 
International Chamber of Commerce requested that the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council organize a convention to address this issue.123  
After five years of proposals, considerations, and comments, a conference 
was assembled in 1958 for the purpose of drafting a treaty, with delegations 
from forty-five nations in attendance.124  In the midst of the conference, 
Sweden proposed that in addition to promoting the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, the treaty should contain a provision promoting the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.125  After some debate about whether the conference 
was even authorized to address the issue of arbitration agreements, the 
delegates were persuaded that without a provision addressing the recognition 
of arbitration agreements, the entire issue of the enforcement of arbitral 
awards could be circumvented by hostile courts.126 
 
 122. Quigley, supra note 120, at 1059 (“Soon after the establishment of the United Nations 
after World War II, attempts were made to work out a multilateral solution to the problem of 
enforcing foreign arbitral awards.”). 
 123. See Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United 
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 3 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1971) (“In 1953, the International Chamber of Commerce, 
anxious to promote a solution to the problem of enforcing foreign arbitral awards, requested the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council to convene an international convention on the 
subject . . . .”). 
 124. See Quigley, supra note 120, at 1059–60 (describing the steps leading up to the 
conference, and the nations and organizations in attendance at the conference). 
 125. Id. at 1063 (explaining that Sweden proposed a provision that would promote the 
recognition of arbitral agreements). 
 126. Id. (“The Conference debated whether the Economic and Social Council Resolution 
calling the Conference authorized it to deal at all with agreements, and was finally convinced by the 
United Kingdom delegate that a Convention on awards with no provision recognizing the underlying 
arbitral agreement would be too easily nullified.”).  Originally, the conference had no intention of 
addressing arbitration agreements, preferring to deal with that issue in a separate treaty.  See Pieter 
Sanders, The Making of the Convention, in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 3, 3–4 (1999) (“[T]he Conference, initially, 
preferred not to deal in the Convention with the arbitration agreement, as the Dutch proposal did.  
Preference was first given to a separate Protocol . . . .”).  Pieter Sanders, an author of the New York 
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On the last day of the conference, the New York Convention was 
officially adopted and signed by twenty-five of the forty-five nations in 
attendance, but not the United States.127  On June 10, 1968, ten years to the 
day after the conference adopted the New York Convention, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson sent the Convention to the U.S. Senate for its “advice 
and consent.”128  The Convention was ratified by the United States in 
1970.129 
The portion of the New York Convention that warrants attention in this 
Article is the abovementioned provision regarding the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, Article II:130 
1.  Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or 
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether 
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. 
 
2.  The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an 
arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams. 
 
 
Convention, wrote the proposed provision that addressed the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
in his father-in-law’s garden during the first weekend of the conference.  Id. at 3 (“[The proposal] 
was conceived during the first weekend of the Conference.  I spent that weekend at the house of my 
father-in-law . . . .  I can still see myself sitting in the garden with my small portable typewriter . . . .  
It was there, sitting in the sun, that the [proposal] was conceived.”). 
 127. Aksen, supra note 123, at 4 (“[T]he formal adoption was made on the last day of the 
meeting . . . .  It was originally signed by 25 of the participants . . . .  [T]he members of the U.S. 
delegation to the U.N. recommended against signature of the Convention.”). 
 128. Id. at 6 (“On June 10, 1968, President Johnson transmitted to the United States Senate for 
its ‘advice and consent’ the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, adopted at the United Nations Conference exactly ten years earlier.”).  Much had changed 
in the preceding decade that precipitated the New York Convention’s ratification: 
 
What appeared to be needed was a threefold development in American law: 1) either 
revision or judicial interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 so that it would 
constitute full exercise by the federal government of its constitutional authority in the 
field of arbitration; 2) enactment by a majority of American states of modern arbitration 
statutes that overruled the common law rule of revocability of arbitration agreements; and 
3) the development of a more ample jurisprudence on the enforcement of foreign awards 
either through judicial or legislative efforts.  In the ten year span following the initial 
promulgation of the U.N. Convention, all three developments occurred. 
 
Aksen, supra note 123, at 4–5. 
 129. Robert J. Gruendel, Domestic Law and International Conventions, the Imperfect Overlay: 
The FAA as a Case Study, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (2001) (“In 1970, the United States ratified 
the New York Convention . . . .”). 
 130. New York Convention, supra note 5, art. II. 
20
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss2/3
[Vol. 12: 267, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
287 
3.  The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.131 
As Article II makes clear, arbitration agreements falling under the New 
York Convention are presumptively valid, and it is incumbent on the party 
resisting arbitration to meet its burden of showing that the agreement should 
not be enforced.132  The mandatory nature with which the New York 
Convention imbues courts’ enforcement of arbitration agreements and the 
difficulty of overcoming the presumption in favor of their validity is what 
has made the Convention so successful—the Convention gives international 
commercial arbitration credibility and consistency.133  With 145 national 
parties to the New York Convention at present,134 the New York Convention 
is not threatened by a lack of widespread acceptance and enforcement:135 In 
a worldwide empirical study on the reasons why parties choose arbitration, 
“the two most significant reasons were (1) the neutrality of the 
forum . . . and (2) the likelihood of obtaining enforcement, by virtue of the 
New York Convention.”136  Rather, the main impediment to the efficacy of 
the New York Convention is the tendency of some nations to question the 
supremacy of the Convention over domestic law, and to use domestic law in 
interpreting the Convention.137  The United States is not entirely without 
responsibility for this problem.138 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Gruendel, supra note 129, at 1495 (“[T]he Convention shifted the burden of proof.  The 
Convention . . . presumes the validity of an agreement . . . .  Under the Convention, a party 
petitioning for enforcement needs only to supply a certified copy of the agreement . . . , whereas the 
resisting party must raise and prove the defenses against enforcement . . . .”). 
 133. BORN, supra note 119, at 123–24 (“[T]he Convention requires national courts 
to . . . recognize and enforce international arbitration agreements . . . .  [A]greements and awards are 
typically subject to an avowedly pro-enforcement international legal regime. . . .  [T]his specialized 
regime materially increases the likelihood that international arbitration agreements will be given 
effect in the courts of contracting states.”). 
 134. See Status 1958—Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2012) (showing the 146 national parties to the New York Convention). 
 135. See MOSES, supra note 120, at 219 (“Overall, the New York Convention has been one of 
the most successful international treaties.”). 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. See id. at 22 (“State courts have not always viewed the Convention as superseding their 
domestic law.  Moreover, even when a court applies the New York Convention, its interpretation 
may be influenced by its national law.”).  See also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 118, at 81 
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2. The Convention’s Implementation 
The New York Convention was implemented in the United States in 
1970 as “Chapter II” of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).139  The entirety 
of the New York Convention is implemented by FAA, Chapter II (the New 
York Convention Act), with slight modifications.140  One such modification 
is in § 206,141 which provides: “A court having jurisdiction under this 
chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement 
at any place therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the 
United States.”142  The difference between the legislative enactment of the 
New York Convention in § 206 and the original text of the Convention is the 
use of the word “may” in “may direct that arbitration be held” in the FAA as 
opposed to “shall” in “shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the 
parties to arbitration,” the former having the appearance of permissive 
language and the latter having the appearance of mandatory language.  This 
is inconsequential for two reasons.  First, the reason for the permissive 
language was provided by the House Report accompanying Chapter II, 
which states that the permissive language does not diminish the directive to 
the courts to enforce arbitration agreements, but merely allows courts to 
direct arbitration to be conducted in a domestic setting rather than abroad 
 
(“[T]he operation of the Convention has not been without practical difficulties.  This is not only 
because there has not been a uniform approach on the interpretation of the Convention by the courts 
of various contracting states, but also because the Convention itself is now beginning to show its 
age.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 138. See Gruendel, supra note 129, at 1495 (“[The New York Convention’s] juxtaposition 
against the Domestic Legislation has, at times, confounded courts and counsel.”). 
 139. See Pub. L. No. 91–368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 
(2010)); Aksen, supra note 123, at 16 (“The new legislation is added to the federal law as ‘Chapter 
II’ of the Act and has as its sole function the responsibility of implementing the Convention that had 
previously been approved by the U.S. Senate on October 4, 1968.”).  The decision to implement the 
New York Convention as Chapter II of the FAA was a practical one.  See id. (“Congress 
has . . . enacted the implementing legislation in an eminently sensible manner.”).  When President 
Johnson sent the Convention to the Senate for advice and consent, he noted that “[c]hanges in Title 9 
(Arbitration) of the United States Code will be required before the United States becomes a party to 
the Convention.”  Id. at 15.  Rather than actually altering the FAA, Congress elected to label the 
existing legislation under the FAA “Chapter I” and the New York Convention’s implementing 
legislation “Chapter II.”  See id. at 16 (“Instead of redrafting and amending the existing language 
contained in the U.S. Arbitration Act, a sounder approach was taken by the simple exigency of 
labeling it as ‘Chapter I,’ thus leaving it completely intact. . . .  The new legislation is added to the 
federal law as ‘Chapter II’ . . . .”).  That way, the case law on Chapter I of the FAA could retain as 
much of its value as possible.  See id. (“Chapter I has had 45 years of history and has been the 
subject of a significant amount of judicial interpretation.”). 
 140. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (implementing the New York Convention). 
 141. Id. § 206. 
 142. Id. 
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when appropriate.143  Second, courts do not rely exclusively on § 206 in 
directing courts to enforce arbitration agreements.  Courts may go directly to 
the New York Convention via § 201 of the New York Convention Act,144 
which provides: “The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States 
courts in accordance with this chapter.”145  Courts may also use provisions of 
Chapter I of the FAA by virtue of Chapter II, § 208, which applies all of 
Chapter I’s provisions to Chapter II if they do not conflict with the New 
York Convention or Chapter II.146  The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that 
both of these approaches are sound.147 
C. The Distinction Between Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties 
The U.S. Constitution deals with treaties twice.  One instance is in the 
Treaty Clause, which provides as follows: “[The President] shall have 
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”148  The other is in 
the Supremacy Clause: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the united 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.149 
Taken together, these two clauses seem to stand for the proposition that 
a treaty, signed by the President with the advice and consent and a two-
 
 143. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3604 
(“Section 106 permits a court to direct that arbitration be held at the place provided for in the 
arbitration agreement.  Since there may be circumstances in which it would be highly desirable to 
direct arbitration within the district in which the action is brought and inappropriate to direct 
arbitration abroad, Section 206 is permissive rather than mandatory.”). 
 144. 9 U.S.C. § 201. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. § 208 (“Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the 
extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United 
States.”). 
 147. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 618–19 
(1985) (“Mitsubishi sought an order, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 201, to compel arbitration . . . .”). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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thirds vote of the Senate, becomes actionable law in the courts of the United 
States.  However, this is emphatically not the case, due to the differentiation 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.150  Multiple federal 
courts have termed the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties—an issue that has caused a great deal of debate among 
scholars and courts alike151—the “most confounding”152 in United States 
treaty law.153  The effect of the distinction is significant and has recently 
been summed up by the U.S. Supreme Court succinctly: 
The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey different meanings.  
What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as 
federal law upon ratification.  Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by itself 
give rise to domestically enforceable federal law.  Whether such a treaty has domestic 
effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.154 
Therefore, in the context of the New York Convention and the New 
York Convention Act, this distinction is critical to deciding whether the 
Convention itself, or merely its implementing legislation, is enforceable 
federal law.  However, whether a given treaty, such as the New York 
Convention, is self-executing or not is a very difficult call to make given the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s perplexing jurisprudence on the issue.155  This subpart 
explores the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing 
treaties.  Section 1 outlines the historical background regarding treaties.  
Section 2 delineates the early jurisprudence in which the distinction first 
appeared.  Section 3 describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent 
decision regarding the distinction and the controversy surrounding that 
decision.  Finally, section 4 discusses the implications of the distinction for 
the New York Convention. 
 
 150. See infra notes 156–214 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between self-
executing and non-self-executing treaties). 
 151. See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 540, 540 (2008) (“Despite its pedigree, both the theory behind the self-execution doctrine 
and its mechanics have long befuddled courts and commentators.”). 
 152. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 695, 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vázquez, Four Doctrines]. 
 153. Id. (stating that courts and scholars have found the distinction the “most confounding” in 
United States treaty law). 
 154. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008). 
 155. Bradley, supra note 151, at 540 (“There is significant uncertainty . . . concerning the 
materials that are relevant to the self-execution analysis, whose intent should count in determining 
self-executing status, the proper presumption that should be applied with respect to self-execution, 
and the domestic legal status of a non-self-executing treaty.”). 
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When the Framers crafted the Constitution, they had their experience in 
the British foreign affairs context in mind.156  In Great Britain, all treaties 
were and are essentially non-self-executing;157 to have domestic legal effect, 
both Parliament and municipal statutes must implement a treaty.158  A more 
immediate concern of the Framers was the status of treaties during Colonial 
and Revolutionary America, in which states consistently violated treaties 
ratified by the Continental Congress, and viewed them as unenforceable in 
the courts of the states.159  This hindered the young nation.160  The 
Supremacy Clause was thus an answer to this problem,161 as the Framers 
were eager to avoid making the same mistakes that the British and early 
Americans made,162 particularly when it came to aggravating formidable 
 
 156. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the 
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1986–87 (1999) (“[A]s former members of the 
British Empire, those who wrote and ratified the Constitution would have understood the new frame 
of government by comparing it to their experience under the British system.”). 
 157. Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 152, at 697 (“[U]nder the fundamental law of Great 
Britain, all treaties are ‘non-self-executing.’”).  The British monarchy and Parliament struggled for 
centuries over control of foreign affairs and the treaty-making power.  See Yoo, supra note 156, at 
1997–2004 (describing the history of British treaty-making and the centuries-long strife between 
Parliament and the Crown over foreign affairs). 
 158. Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 152, at 697 (“If a treaty contemplates that 
individuals will be treated in certain ways or their rights and liabilities governed by particular rules, 
the treaty must be ‘implemented’ by Parliament and the required norms incorporated into municipal 
law by statute.”). 
 159. Id. at 698 (“Among the problems of the period of the Articles of Confederation were the 
repeated violations by the states of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain.  The problem was 
aggravated by the widespread understanding during this period that the treaties concluded by the 
Continental Congress were not enforceable as law in the courts of the states in the face of conflicting 
state legislation.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 160. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the 
Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 617 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties 
as Law] (“Congress had concluded . . . treaties, . . . but the states violated them, causing significant 
problems for the fledgling nation . . . .  [T]he Treaty of Peace gave British creditors specific rights 
against their America debtors, but the states had passed laws making it difficult or impossible for the 
British to recover in court.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 161. Id. at 619 (“[In drafting the Supremacy Clause], the founders recognized the limited effect, 
and limited efficacy, of treaties under international law.  To achieve certain purposes they regarded 
as important to the nation, they gave the treaties concluded by the nation additional force as a matter 
of domestic constitutional law.”). 
 162. Id. at 615, 617 (“The clause thus represented a clear break from the British approach. . . .  
The Supremacy Clause was [also] the Founders’ solution to one of the principal ‘vices’ or ‘evils’ of 
the Articles of Confederation.”). 
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foreign nations.163  However, scholars are in sharp disagreement as to 
whether the Framers’ familiarity with the weaknesses in the prior systems 
evidences an intent to be rid of the notion of non-self-executing treaties or, 
on the contrary, an awareness that the non-self-executing treaty distinction 
would endure to some degree in their new nation.164  Whichever view is 
correct, it is beyond doubt that the non-self-executing treaty distinction has 
survived with force in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
1. Early Jurisprudence 
The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties 
was “introduced into U.S. jurisprudence”165 in 1829 by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Foster v. Neilson.166  Foster dealt with a land dispute that hinged on 
a treaty by which Spain ceded land to the United States, but provided that 
 
 163. Id. at 617 (“There was general agreement at the Constitutional Convention that the new 
Constitution had to empower the federal government to enforce treaties.  The Founders were anxious 
to avoid treaty violations because such violations threatened to provoke wars and otherwise 
complicate relations with more powerful nations.”). 
 164. Compare, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2120 (1999) 
(“The imperative need to make treaties legally binding on both the states and their citizens was 
widely recognized by 1787.  The major consequence . . . was the ready adoption of the supremacy 
clause, which gave treaties the status of law and made them judicially enforceable through the 
federal courts.”); Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 152, at 698 (“Ultimately, the Framers 
adopted the Supremacy Clause.  The clause addressed the treaty violation problem by altering the 
British rule: it declared treaties to be ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ and directed the courts to give 
them effect without awaiting action by the legislatures of either the states or the federal 
government.”); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377,413 (2009) 
(“The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S. treaty violations by empowering the 
courts to enforce treaties at the behest of affected individuals without awaiting authorization from 
state or federal legislatures.” (internal quotations omitted)); Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 
160, at 605 (“In order to avoid the foreign relations difficulties that would result from treaty 
violations, and to capture the benefits of a reputation for treaty compliance, the Founders gave 
treaties the force of domestic law enforceable in domestic courts.”); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as 
“Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 112 (2009) (“[The Supremacy C]lause explicitly 
incorporates treaties into domestic law, and the relevant history strongly suggests that this language 
was a deliberate attempt to depart from the British rule, which held that a treaty could not alter 
domestic law without action by Parliament.”), with David H. Moore, Law(Makers) of the Land: The 
Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 33 (2009) (“The [Supremacy] 
Clause was not designed to address the scope of the federal treatymakers’ authority to control the 
domestic implementation of treaty duties.”); Yoo, supra note 156, at 2072 (“When the ratification is 
viewed comprehensively, particularly with attention to the three most significant state conventions, 
the evidence indicates that the Constitution’s supporters understood the treaty power to be an 
executive power that was distinct from, and could not supplant, Congress’s power to legislate.”).  
 165. Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 152, at 700. 
 166. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829). 
26
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss2/3
[Vol. 12: 267, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
293 
prior land grants by Spain would be preserved.167  The Court examined the 
Spain–United States treaty for its domestic effect.168  The Foster Court 
focused on the words “shall be ratified and confirmed,”169 which the Court 
saw as aspirational language, raising doubts as to whether the treaty was 
self-executing.170  The Court recognized that a treaty was viewed by most 
countries as “in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative 
act”171 that “does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be 
accomplished . . . but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the 
respective parties to the instrument.”172  But according to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the United States dealt with treaties differently.173  Because a treaty in 
the United States is “the law of the land,”174 it must “be regarded in courts of 
justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself 
without the aid of any legislative provision.”175  However, when a treaty 
takes the form of “a contract,”176 it “addresses itself to the 
political . . . department, and the legislature must execute the contract.”177  In 
Foster, as a matter of construction, the treaty in question was non-self-
executing: If the relevant provision had read “shall be valid,”178 rather than 
“shall be ratified and confirmed,”179 then “it would have acted directly on the 
subject, and would have repealed those acts of congress which were 
 
 167. See id. at 299–308 (describing a dispute over a tract of land that depended on the 
construction of a treaty that ceded land to the United States, but attempted to preserve prior land 
grants by Spain). 
 168. Id. (recognizing the need to analyze the treaty to determine whether it had domestic 
effect). 
 169. Id. at 314. 
 170. See id. (“Do these words act directly on the grants, so as to give validity to those not 
otherwise valid; or do they pledge the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and 
confirm them?”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. (“In the United States a different principle is established.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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repugnant to it.”180  It bears noting that this was one of two holdings, and 
scholars have debated whether it was therefore dicta.181 
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the same treaty 
dealt with in Foster was self-executing in United States v. Percheman.182  In 
that case, the original, Spanish version of the treaty had been brought to the 
Court’s attention,183 and was translated to say that the land “grants ‘shall 
remain ratified and confirmed to the person in possession of them.’”184  The 
Court determined that the English version’s seemingly non-self-executing 
language was not necessarily non-self-executing,185 and could be read to 
“import that they ‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ by force of the 
instrument itself.”186  The Court found this to be the better reading of the 
treaty,187 because if the English and Spanish versions of the treaty could be 
read to agree,188 that would indicate the understanding of the United States in 
ratifying the treaty.189  In sum, the Court had changed its mind and decided 
the language was self-executing, after determining that the branches that 
ratified the treaty had understood it as self-executing.  Such was the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the distinction between self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties when the Court decided Medellín v. Texas190 
 
 180. Id. at 314–15. 
 181. See Yoo, supra note 156, at 2088 (“The Court could have concluded [after holding that it 
was bound to defer to the legislature] . . . , because a finding that Spain never possessed the land in 
question removed the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims. . . .  Foster’s further discussion of self-
executing treaties constituted only an alternative holding, and was dicta.”).  But see Vázquez, Four 
Doctrines, supra note 152, at 702 n.35 (“[T]he ‘self-execution’ holding in Foster was one of two 
independent grounds for denying relief . . . .  Before holding that it was not self-executing, the Court 
held (by a divided vote) that the 1819 treaty between Spain and the United States was 
inapplicable.”). 
 182. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 89 (1833) (“[The wording of the treaty] may 
import that [the Spanish land grants] ‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ by force of the instrument 
itself. . . .  [W]e think the construction proper, if not unavoidable.”). 
 183. See id. at 88 (“The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in the English language; 
both are originals, and were unquestionably intended by the parties to be identical.  The Spanish has 
been translated . . . .”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 89 (“Although the words ‘shall be ratified and confirmed,’ are properly the words of 
contract, stipulating for some future legislative act; they are not necessarily so.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. (“[W]e think the construction proper, if not unavoidable.”). 
 188. See id. (“If the English and Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that 
construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail.”). 
 189. See id. at 88–89 (“[I]f this security would have been complete without the article, the 
United States could have no motive for insisting on the interposition of government in order to give 
validity to the titles which, according to the usages of the civilized world, were already valid.”). 
 190. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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in 2008,191 the Court’s “first decision ever to deny relief solely on non-self-
execution grounds.”192 
2. Medellín 
The Medellín Court found itself tasked with the interpretation of an 
ambiguous treaty, and looked first to its text.193  Because the relevant 
provision of the treaty at issue provided that the United States “undertakes to 
comply”194 with its treaty obligation, the Court construed the provision “not 
[to be] a directive to domestic courts.”195  The text of the treaty did not 
“indicate that the Senate that ratified the [treaty] intended [it would 
have] . . . immediate legal effect in domestic courts.”196  The Court then 
examined other provisions in the treaty and determined that the language of 
those provisions also indicated non-self-execution,197 and that the President’s 
and Senate’s awareness of those provisions indicated their understanding 
upon ratification of the treaty that it would be non-self-executing.198  The 
majority continued by bolstering its conclusion with a smattering of other 
factors: (1) that the effect of deeming the treaty self-executing would 
undermine a separate provision of the treaty;199 (2) that the treaty’s self-
execution might intrude on the discretion of the executive and legislative 
branches;200 (3) that other signatory nations have not given the treaty binding 
 
 191. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 160, at 646 (“[T]he Court hewed closely to the 
analysis of Foster, characterizing Percheman (not altogether accurately) as having overruled 
Foster . . . .”). 
 192. See id. at 646. 
 193. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a 
statute, begins with its text.”). 
 194. Id. at 508. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 509 (examining other provisions of the treaty and finding that they suggest that 
the treaty was non-self-executing). 
 198. See id. at 509–10 (“[T]he President and Senate were undoubtedly aware [of the 
provision] . . . .  This was the understanding of the Executive Branch when the President agreed to 
[the treaty] . . . .”). 
 199. See id. at 510–11 (stating that if the treaty was deemed self-executing, another clause 
would be rendered useless, and that “there is no reason to believe that the President and Senate 
signed up for such a result”). 
 200. See id. at 511 (stating that this treaty’s self-execution might restrict the foreign relations 
powers reserved to the political departments). 
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effect in domestic courts;201 and (4) that the “Executive Branch has 
unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create 
domestically enforceable federal law,”202 a significant factor since “[i]t 
is . . . well settled that the United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled 
to great weight.’”203  Hence, the Court found the treaty at issue to be non-
self-executing.204 
The Medellín decision has generally been seen as confusing.205  The 
Court took into account a significant number of factors in the course of its 
decision that the treaty at issue was non-self-executing,206 and the Court’s 
decision could be read in many ways.207  Nonetheless, given that the Court 
stated repeatedly that it was looking to the intent of the Executive Branch 
and the Senate,208 and summed up its argument by stating that “[n]othing in 
the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among 
signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended” the treaty to 
be self-executing, one clear rule from the case is that the intent of the 
political departments who ratified the treaty determines whether a treaty is 
self-executing.209  One scholar challenges this reading of Medellín,210 
arguing that “[i]n each case but one, the majority referred to the intent of the 
 
 201. See id. at 516 (“Our conclusion . . . is confirmed by the ‘postratification understanding’ of 
signatory nations.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)). 
 204. Id. (ruling that the treaty was non-self-executing). 
 205. See, e.g., Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 160, at 647 (“The [Medellín] opinion is not 
a model of clarity.”).  See also Bradley, supra note 151, at 540 (“The Court . . . appears to have 
concluded that it is the intent of the U.S. treaty makers that should be determinative of self-
execution, although the Court was somewhat unclear on this point.”). 
 206. See supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text (delineating the various components of 
the majority’s analysis in concluding that the treaty it was interpreting was non-self-executing). 
 207. See generally Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 160. 
 208. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519 (“[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the 
textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic 
effect.”); id. at 521 (“Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a 
determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has 
domestic effect.”); id. at 523 (“Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or 
practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable 
result of [self-execution] . . . .”). 
 209. Id.  Accord Bradley, supra note 151, at 544 (“On balance, . . . the Court’s decision is best 
interpreted as endorsing an intent-of-the-U.S. approach.”).  But see Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra 
note 160, at 658 (“[S]ome commentators have read Medellín to [say that] . . . the intent of the U.S. 
treatymakers is determinative. . . .  [T]he majority opinion cannot be read to have embraced 
[that] . . . approach.”). 
 210. See Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 160, at 658–59 (challenging the proposition that 
Medellín determined self-execution based on the intent of the Executive and the Senate). 
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Senate as reflected in the terms of the treaty.”211  This view appears to 
reverse the Court’s reasoning; however, the Medellín Court stated that it 
thought “it rather important to look at the treaty language to see what it has 
to say about the issue [of self-execution]”212 because “[t]hat is after all what 
the Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty.”213  This 
reading also accords with a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
stating that when the Senate ratifies a treaty, with an accompanying 
declaration that it is non-self-executing, the declaration is definitive proof 
that the treaty is non-self-executing.214 
3. The New York Convention is Non-Self-Executing 
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s relatively few decisions on the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, the New 
York Convention should be seen as non-self-executing.  While the language 
of the provision directing enforcement of arbitration agreements is 
mandatory,215 the U.S. Supreme Court’s enduring focus on the intention and 
understanding of the political branches that ratified the treaty strongly 
indicates non-self-execution.216  President Johnson, upon submitting the 
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, stated that “[c]hanges in title 
9 (arbitration) of the United States Code will be required before the United 
States becomes a party to the convention.  The United States instrument of 
accession to the convention will be executed only after the necessary 
legislation is enacted.”217  The Senate, in turn, reported in giving its advice 
and consent that “[c]hanges in the Federal Arbitration Act (title 9 of the 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (“[T]he United States ratified the 
Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not create 
obligations enforceable in the federal courts. . . .  Accordingly, [the Covenant is not] . . . the relevant 
and applicable rule of international law.”). 
 215. See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text (stating that the New York Convention 
directs that “[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of 
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration”). 
 216. See supra notes 165–189, 192–214 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s repeated emphasis on the understanding and intent of the political branches that ratified a 
treaty). 
 217. 114 CONG. REC. S10,488 (1968) (message of President Johnson). 
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United States Code) will be required before the United States becomes a 
party to the convention.”218  Therefore, because both Foster and Medellín 
repeatedly asserted that the intent and understanding of the political 
branches that ratified a treaty are the prime indicator of self-execution—or 
non-self-execution, as in this case—,219 it would be fallacious to defy the 
understanding of President Johnson and the Senate that the New York 
Convention would not have domestic legal effect except by virtue of the 
FAA.  Moreover, since the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a declaration 
by the United States that a treaty is non-self-executing decisively means that 
the treaty is non-self-executing,220 an explicit statement by the Executive 
Branch and the Senate that a treaty will only have domestic legal effect by 
virtue of its implementing legislation should dictate the same outcome. 
This conclusion is supported by an additional portion of the Medellín 
opinion that warrants particular attention.  The New York Convention Act is 
cited to support the proposition that “Congress is up to the task of 
implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those involving complex 
commercial disputes.”221  This statement was concededly dictum, but still 
must be regarded as a strong indication of the Court’s understanding. 
Taken as a whole, these statements by the U.S. Supreme Court 
persuasively promote the viewpoint that the New York Convention is non-
self-executing.  Even without this evidence of the New York Convention’s 
non-self-executing status, given the confusion surrounding Medellín,222 it 
would be unwise for a court to proceed on the assumption that the New York 
Convention is self-executing absent clarification by the U.S. Supreme 
Court—and this is likely the reason that the only judge ever to decide the 
New York Convention was self-executing was Judge Clement, concurring in 
Safety National.223 
 
 218. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10, at 2 (Sept. 27, 1968). 
 219. See supra notes 165–189, 192–214 and accompanying text (highlighting the Medellín and 
Foster Courts’ repeated emphasis on the understanding and intent of the political branches that 
ratified a treaty in determining its status as self-executing or non-self-executing). 
 220. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (recounting a U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
regarded a declaration by the United States that a treaty was non-self-executing as definitive proof 
that the treaty was, indeed, non-self-executing). 
 221. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008) (“See, e.g., . . . 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 . . . .  
Such language demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international 
obligations when it desires such a result.”). 
 222. See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text (stating that Medellín has caused 
confusion among scholars and courts). 
 223. See infra notes 377–83 and accompanying text (describing Judge Clement’s concurrence 
and its reading of the New York Convention as self-executing). 
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D. The Foreign Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause states that Congress shall have power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”224  
While the wording of the clause might appear to put Congress’s power to 
regulate foreign commerce and interstate commerce on parity, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held the Foreign Commerce Clause to have different 
justifications, and to be a broader delegation of authority to Congress.225  
This subpart examines the Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence in 
section 1, and analyzes its effect on congressional assent in sections 2 and 3. 
1. The Foreign Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and Its Significance 
The case law on the subject of the Foreign Commerce Clause mainly 
regards what is known as the “dormant” Foreign Commerce Clause.226  To 
put this case law in perspective, it is worthwhile to note that dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis involves the limitations on state regulation of 
areas in which Congress could legislate under the Commerce Clause, but has 
not.227  The leading case on the use of the Foreign Commerce Clause is 
 
 224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 225. Japan Line, Ltd. v. L.A. Cnty., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (“Although the Constitution, Art. 
I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the 
several States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the 
foreign commerce power to be the greater.”). 
 226. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 966 (2010) 
(“The scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause vis-à-vis the sates has arisen more recently in the 
context of the ‘dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.’”). 
 227. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce 
Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3—Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2009) (“The 
United States Supreme Court has consistently construed the Commerce Clause to imply a further 
command, known as the negative or ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state 
regulation even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.”).  Buchwalter provides a 
concise summary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Interstate Commerce Clause jurisprudence: 
 
The Court has understood this interpretation as promoting the Commerce Clause’s 
purpose of preventing a state from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the 
welfare of the nation as a whole as would occur if the states were free to impose burdens 
on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders 
would not endure. 
 
. . . . 
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Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,228 the first case to utilize and 
fully explicate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.229 
Japan Line dealt with a Los Angeles property tax on shipping containers 
of six Japanese companies which were temporarily present in a port in Los 
Angeles.230  The Japanese companies challenged the tax as 
unconstitutional.231  The Court was willing to assume that based on the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce test, under Interstate Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the tax would be constitutional.232  Significantly, 
however, the Court stated that Commerce Clause analysis with respect to 
foreign and interstate commerce is not coequal,233 and “a more extensive 
constitutional inquiry is required.”234 
 
The Commerce Clause operates as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in 
the absence of conflicting federal statute.  In a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 
the court must inquire whether the challenged law discriminates against interstate 
commerce, in which case the law is virtually per se invalid, and survives only if it 
advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.  Absent discrimination against interstate commerce, 
the law is upheld unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to putative local benefits. . . .  Through the application of this 
balancing test, however, even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be 
struck down under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause on a showing that 
they clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice. 
 
Id. 
 228. Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434. 
 229. Leanne M. Wilson, Note, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After 
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 754 (2007) (“Japan Line, Ltd. V. County of Los 
Angeles was the first case decided using the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.”). 
 230. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 436–37 (“[Six Japanese shipping companies’] containers, in 
the course of their international journeys, pass through appellees’ jurisdictions intermittently. . . .  
Property present in California on March 1 . . . of any year is subject to ad valorem property tax. . . .  
[Los Angeles] levied property taxes . . . on the assessed value of the containers present . . . .”). 
 231. Id. at 440 (“Appellants squarely challenged the constitutionality of the tax . . . .”). 
 232. Id. at 445 (“We may assume that, if the containers at issue here were instrumentalities of 
purely interstate commerce, Complete Auto would apply and be satisfied, and our Commerce Clause 
inquiry would be at an end.”). 
 234. See id. at 446 (“The premise of appellees’ argument is that the Commerce Clause analysis 
is identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is involved.  This premise, we have 
concluded, must be rejected.  When construing Congress’s power to ‘regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”). 
234.See id. at 446 (“The premise of appellees’ argument is that the Commerce Clause analysis is 
identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign commerce is involved.  This premise, we have 
concluded, must be rejected.  When construing Congress’s power to ‘regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations,’ a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.”). 
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Beginning its Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, the Court expressed a 
pragmatic concern about the risk of multiple taxation;235 that is, foreign 
companies would be taxed in full by their home country, and then taxed 
again by the United States.236  The second problem posed by the Los 
Angeles tax was its threat to “uniformity in an area where federal uniformity 
is essential.”237 
Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national concern.  “In international 
relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States 
act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.”  Although 
the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce “with 
foreign Nations” and “among the several States” in parallel phrases, there is evidence that 
the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be greater.  Cases of 
this Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating with other nations, echo this 
distinction.238 
According to the Court, “federal uniformity”239 could be threatened in at 
least two ways.  First, if the taxes levied by a state or states 
disproportionately hurt foreign domiciliaries, foreign nations could retaliate 
against United States domiciliaries240—not only those in the offending state 
or states, but across the country.241  Second, if multiple states engaged in 
offending taxation, the variety of taxing regimes would “plainly prevent this 
Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.”242 
Applying these concerns to the facts of the case, the Court held the tax 
unconstitutional as applied.243  The Court found first that multiple taxation 
 
 235. See id. (“[A]dditional considerations, beyond those articulated in Complete Auto, come 
into play.  The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxation.”). 
 236. See id. at 446–47 (“In order to prevent multiple taxation of interstate commerce, this Court 
has required that taxes be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions, so that no instrumentality of 
commerce is subjected to more than one tax on its full value.”). 
 237. Id. at 448. 
 238. Id. at 448–49 (internal citations omitted). 
 239. Id. at 449. 
 240. See id. (“If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, foreign 
nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned instrumentalities present in 
their jurisdictions.”). 
 241. See id. (“Such retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation 
equipment in general, not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer.”). 
 242. Id. at 450–51. 
 243. Id. at 453 (“California’s ad valorem tax, as applied to appellants’ containers . . . is 
inconsistent with Congress’ power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’  We hold the tax, 
as applied unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.”). 
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would follow from the Los Angeles tax.244  Furthermore, the Court found 
that the tax would prevent national uniformity in foreign commerce,245 partly 
because of the variety of tax regimes that would follow when other states 
also taxed foreign domiciliaries.246  The Court devoted the most focus and 
emphasis, however, to the fact that, under the Customs Convention on 
Containers (of which both the United States and Japan are signatories), a 
policy was articulated “to remove impediments to the use of containers”247 in 
foreign commerce.248  The Court explained that, because violation of this 
policy would constitute a breach of an international obligation, the 
Convention reflected the very real possibility of retaliation by Japan and 
other signatories.249  Therefore, the Los Angeles tax was unconstitutional.250 
The outer boundaries of the Japan Line decision were unclear for a time 
after the decision was handed down.251  Four years later, in Container Corp. 
of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the U.S. Supreme Court provided some 
clarification.252  The Court created a distinction between state action that 
“merely has foreign resonances, but does not implicate foreign affairs,”253 
and that which does “implicate foreign affairs.”254  While the former is 
violative of the Foreign Commerce Clause if it contravenes a “clear federal 
directive,”255 the latter is violative of the Foreign Commerce Clause even in 
Congress’s silence.256  The Court also deemphasized the implications of 
 
 244. See id. at 451–52 (finding that the Los Angeles and Japanese taxes would overlap). 
 245. Id. at 452 (“California’s tax prevents this Nation from ‘speaking with one voice’ in 
regulating foreign trade.”). 
 246. Id. at 453 (“If other States follow California’s example . . . , foreign-owned containers will 
be subjected to various degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports they enter.  
This result, obviously, would make ‘speaking with one voice’ impossible.”). 
 247. Id. at 453. 
 248. See id. at 452–53 (stating that both the United States and Japan signed the Customs 
Convention on Containers, and that the Convention reflects a national policy in favor of removing 
impediments). 
 249. Id. at 453 (“California’s tax thus creates an asymmetry in international maritime taxation 
operating to Japan’s disadvantage.  The risk of retaliation by Japan, under these circumstances, is 
acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole.”); id. at 453 n.18 
(“Retaliation by some nations could be automatic.”). 
 250. Id. at 454 (“We hold the tax, as applied, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.”).  
 251. See Wilson, supra note 229, at 756 (“The Japan Line analysis—that state laws impairing 
either national uniformity with respect to foreign commerce or the ability of the nation to speak with 
one voice in foreign affairs are invalid—lacked obvious limits.”). 
 252. See generally Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
 253. Id. at 194. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. (“[A] state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ standard 
if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates 
a clear federal directive.”). 
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double taxation, focusing more on the national uniformity issue in foreign 
commerce.257  The Court singled out one indicator for whether a state 
regulation implicates foreign policy:258 “[T]he threat it might pose of 
offending our foreign trading partners and leading them to retaliate against 
the nation as a whole.”259  The Court found no such “threat” in Container 
Corp.,260 and the Court found that no foreign policy implication was 
present.261  Japan Line and Container Corp. represent the entirety of relevant 
Foreign Commerce Clause analysis, as the U.S. Supreme Court has since 
avoided Foreign Commerce Clause issues.262 
One significant principle emerges from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence: The justifications underlying the 
Foreign Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause are distinct, 
 
 257. See id. (“[A]n absolute rule is no more appropriate here than it was in Japan Line itself, 
where we relied on much more than the mere fact of double taxation to strike down the state tax at 
issue.”). 
 258. See id. (“The most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat it might 
pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading them to retaliate against the nation as a 
whole.”). 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 195 (finding no threat of retaliation for the tax at issue). 
 261. See id. at 195–96 (“[W]hen combined with all the other considerations we have discussed, 
it does suggest that the foreign policy of the United States—whose nuances, we must emphasize 
again, are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court—is not 
seriously threatened . . . .”). 
 262. See Wilson, supra note 229, at 766 (“The Court did not address the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause in . . . recent decision[s]—and consequently the doctrine could . . . emerge 
unscathed.”).  While the U.S. Supreme Court has decided one more recent decision on Commerce 
Clause grounds, that decision lacked majority with respect to the Foreign Commerce Clause issue.  
See generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).  One recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case dealt with the Foreign Affairs power of the Executive and overturned both a 
state statute and the McCarran–Ferguson Act because they were preempted by an Executive 
Agreement.  See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (“The principal argument 
for preemption made by petitioners and the United States as amicus curiae is that HVIRA interferes 
with foreign policy of the Executive Branch . . . .”); id. at 414 (“[T]he historical gloss on the 
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President’s [Foreign 
Affairs power] . . . .”); id. at 428 (“[A] federal statute directed to implied preemption by domestic 
commerce legislation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption by executive conduct in 
foreign affairs.”); id. at 420 (“[W]e think petitioners and the government have demonstrated a 
sufficiently clear conflict to require finding preemption here.”).  However, the Foreign Affairs power 
is not applicable to the New York Convention, which, if deemed non-self-executing, cannot be made 
self-executing by the President.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (“The President 
has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but 
unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.”). 
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and the law of one is not equivalent to the law of the other.263  Following this 
reasoning, some lower courts have resolved the issue of whether the New 
York Convention can be reverse preempted by the McCarran–Ferguson Act 
by interpreting the legislative intent of McCarran–Ferguson as only lifting 
the Interstate Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation and not the 
Foreign Commerce Clause restrictions.264  The problem with this rationale is 
that, while the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that McCarran–Ferguson was 
only intended to set back the clock to pre-SEUA conditions,265 thereby 
reversing only the Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation, the 
differentiation between the reach of the Interstate Commerce Clause and that 
of the Foreign Commerce Clause was not articulated by the Court until 
1978,266 a full thirty-three years after the passage of the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act.267  Therefore, Congress could not have had the distinction between 
foreign and interstate commerce in mind; however, the Foreign Commerce 
Clause cases are nonetheless significant.  In the line of cases differentiating 
the Foreign Commerce Clause from the Interstate Commerce Clause, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether Congress is 
able to acquiesce to state regulation of matters that would properly be 
considered foreign commerce.268 
 
 263. See supra notes 224–62 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the Foreign Commerce Clause, with the justifications of apportionment and 
national uniformity, as distinct from the Interstate Commerce Clause, which is justified as protecting 
Congress’s prerogative to control interstate commerce and the national welfare generally).  
 264. See, e.g., Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., 2003 
A.M.C. 251, 254 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“[T]he Court finds that reverse preemption under the McCarran–
Ferguson Act . . . does not apply here . . . .  The McCarran–Ferguson Act . . . was intended to apply 
only to interstate commerce, and not foreign commerce.”); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Jantran, 906 F. Supp. 
362, 366 (1995) (finding that the McCarran–Ferguson Act applies to interstate, but not to foreign, 
commerce); Arbitration Between W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Am. Marine Corp., 
1993 A.M.C. 1351, 1355 (E.D. La. 1992) (“The McCarran–Ferguson Act does not apply to contracts 
made under the Convention, as it was intended to apply only to interstate commerce, not to foreign 
commerce.”). 
 265. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (showing how a line of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases established that the McCarran–Ferguson Act was meant to reverse SEUA and therefore lifted 
only preexisting Commerce Clause restrictions). 
 266. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (recounting how the U.S. Supreme Court first 
established a separate line of Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence with Japan Line in 1978). 
 267. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (stating that the McCarran–Ferguson Act was 
passed in 1945). 
 268. See supra notes 229–62 and accompanying text (describing modern Foreign Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, which never addresses congressional assent). 
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3. When Congress Cannot Assent: Admiralty 
Importantly, one line of decisions altogether forecloses the possibility of 
Congress’s assent to state regulation in an area in which Congress has been 
delegated authority by the Constitution: Admiralty law.269  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that states cannot apply workers’ compensation 
laws to dockworkers because it would be a violation of Congress’s dormant 
Admiralty power.270  Congress responded with legislation granting authority 
to the states to do just that.271  In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,272 the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down this legislation.273  Significantly, the Court 
cited the need for uniformity as its sole rationale, stating that the motivation 
underlying the Constitution’s grant of Admiralty power to Congress was “to 
commit direct control to the federal government, to relieve maritime 
commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to 
discordant legislation, and to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and 
uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union.”274  The Court 
reasoned that the need for uniform regulation militated against allowing any 
enactment or modification to the law of admiralty “except by legislation 
which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress.”275  If 
the states were allowed to legislate where Congress was granted that 
authority, it “would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which 
the Constitution not only contemplated, but actually established—it would 
 
 269. See William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A 
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387, 402 (1983) (“Only one line of Supreme 
Court cases has ever prevented Congress from authorizing the states to exercise regulatory power 
that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the federal government.”).  See also David J. Bederman, 
Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 2 (1997) 
(“[There is] the existence of a non-delegable, constitutional core of admiralty law that not even 
Congress can make non-uniform . . . .”). 
 270. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) (“Exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is vested in the Federal district courts . . . .  The remedy 
which the Compensation Statute attempts to give is . . . not saved to suitors from the grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
 271. See Bederman, supra note 269, at 19 (stating that “Congress had fashioned a legislative 
response” that was “masterfully simple,” applying state workers’ compensation laws to “accidents 
occurring on the navigable waters of the United States”). 
 272. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). 
 273. Id. at 163 (“[S]o construed, we think the enactment is beyond the power of Congress.”).  
 274. Id. at 164. 
 275. Id. 
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defeat the very purpose of the grant.”276  This ruling was affirmed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court four years later in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & 
Co.,277 and has never been overruled.278 
3. Congress Cannot Assent to Abrogation of Its Foreign Commerce 
Clause Power 
Since the authority granted to Congress under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause—unlike the Interstate Commerce Clause—has national uniformity as 
its sole rationale,279 there is no readily apparent reason why Foreign 
Commerce Clause authority should be treated any differently than 
Congress’s Admiralty power.  Consequently, not only has the U.S. Supreme 
Court never ruled that Congress may authorize the states to regulate foreign 
commerce, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence actually dictates against such 
an authorization. 
There can be no doubt that the enforcement of international arbitration 
agreements implicates foreign commerce and foreign policy.  International 
arbitration agreements, by their very definition, arise exclusively out of 
international commercial transactions.280  Because the U.S. Supreme Court 
has twice singled out the risk of retaliation as the single greatest, definitive 
factor in determining when an international commercial legal issue 
implicates foreign policy,281 the fact that failure to honor international 
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts would violate the New York 
Convention and expose the United States to a very real risk of retaliation 
 
 276. Id. at 164.  See also Cohen, supra note 269, at 402 (“[The Court] discovered an unbending 
constitutional requirement of national uniformity that could not yield to contrary congressional 
judgment.  Indeed, the uniformity requirement was so inflexible that Congress could not even adopt 
existing nonuniform state laws.”). 
 277. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 222 (1924) (“The judgments below 
must be affirmed; the doctrine of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, to which we adhere, permits no 
other conclusion.”). 
 278. See Bederman, supra note 269, at 24 (“Knickerbocker Ice and Dawson have never been 
expressly overruled . . . .”). 
 279. Japan Line, Ltd. v. L.A. Cnty., 441 U.S. 434, 444 (1979) (stating that “[t]he need for 
federal uniformity” derives from “the Framers’ overriding concern that ‘the Federal government 
must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments’” 
(quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))). 
 280. See Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International 
Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 24 (2002) 
(defining international arbitration agreements as choice of forum and law clauses in international 
commercial agreements). 
 281. See supra notes 247–49, 258–59 (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court has twice 
identified the risk of retaliation as the primary indicator of foreign policy implications). 
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undeniably makes this an issue of foreign policy.282  Therefore, U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent reveals that congressional acquiescence to state 
regulation of international arbitration agreements in insurance contracts is an 
unconstitutional forfeiture of power vested exclusively in Congress. 
E. The Treaty Power 
Completely aside from any question of congressional assent to state 
regulation or the Commerce Clause, Congress had an independent source of 
constitutionally delegated authority through which it implemented the New 
York Convention: Congress’s Treaty power.  Missouri v. Holland283 is the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s formative case on Congress’s Treaty power.284  
Section 1 of this subpart describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Holland, and section 2 analyzes its implications with respect to Congress’s 
intent in enacting McCarran–Ferguson. 
1. Missouri v. Holland 
In Holland, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a challenge to the 
implementing legislation of a treaty dealing with migratory birds.285  The 
complication in the case was that legislation attempting to enact the same 
domestic law had been struck down several years earlier as outside 
Congress’s power to regulate under the Constitution.286  Thus, the issue in 
Holland was “whether the treaty and [implementing] statute [were] void as 
an interference with the rights reserved to the States.”287  The Court upheld 
 
 282. Cf. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (“California’s tax thus creates an asymmetry in 
international maritime taxation operating to Japan’s disadvantage.  The risk of retaliation by Japan, 
under these circumstances, is acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a 
whole.”). 
 283. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 284.  See Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Caveat: 
Congressional Power to Implement Treaties, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 318 (2009) (“The most 
important case to address the power of Congress to domesticate treaties free of federalism limitations 
is Missouri v. Holland.”). 
 285. See Holland, 252 U.S. at 430–31 (“This is a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri 
to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act . . . .”). 
 286. See id. at 432 (“An earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of 
a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States had been held bad in the District 
Court.”). 
 287. Id. at 432. 
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the statute.288  The Holland Court found that Congress had the power under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause to implement a 
treaty validly made under the Treaty Clause.289  Therefore, the Court rejected 
the argument that “what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in 
derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do.”290  
Rather, the Court found that what federal legislation could not do “unaided,” 
a treaty followed by implementing legislation could do.291  Holland’s rule 
has never been limited,292 and the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently 
reaffirmed it throughout the ninety-one years since it was decided.293 
2. Congress Did Not Assent to Abrogation of Its Treaty Power 
Holland is vitally relevant to this Article for two reasons.  First, Holland 
expressly establishes that the Treaty power is an independent, 
constitutionally delegated source of authority through which treaties such as 
the New York Convention can be implemented.294  Second, Holland was 
decided in 1920,295 twenty-four years before SEUA was decided.296  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled that the McCarran–Ferguson Act was intended 
only to rescind Commerce Clause restrictions on state regulation of the 
insurance industry.297  Thus, where Congress has passed a law that could 
have been enacted solely under its Treaty power, like the New York 
Convention Act, McCarran–Ferguson does not logically reverse preempt 
that legislation in favor of state legislation.  This conclusion is bolstered by 
the fact that because of Holland’s twenty-four year history at the time of the 
 
 288. Id. at 435 (“We are of the opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld.”). 
 289. See id. at 432 (“[B]y Article 2, Section 2, the power to make treaties is delegated 
expressly, and by Article 6 treaties made . . . are declared the supreme law of the land.  If the treaty 
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1, Section 8 . . . .”). 
 290. Id. at 432. 
 291. See id. at 433–35 (ruling that an act that would be unconstitutional by itself is 
constitutional when committed pursuant to a treaty). 
 292. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 403, 415 (2003) (“This holding has never since been limited.”). 
 293. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (“The treaty-making power 
of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and . . . extend[s] to 
all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations.”). 
 294. See supra notes 283–93 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (showing that Holland was decided in 1920). 
 296. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that the SEUA was decided in 1945). 
 297. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (explaining how a line of U.S. Supreme 
Court cases established that the McCarran–Ferguson Act was meant to reverse SEUA and therefore 
lifted only preexisting Commerce Clause restrictions). 
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SEUA decision,298 Congress must have been aware of the fact that, even 
before SEUA, a federal law enacted pursuant to Congress’s treaty power 
would have preempted state law regulating the insurance industry by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause.  Futhermore, because the U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently ruled that McCarran–Ferguson only gives back the power the 
states had to regulate prior to SEUA,299 Congress could not have intended to 
acquiesce to abrogation of its own constitutionally delegated power to 
implement treaties. 
F. The Policy Favoring Arbitration 
The U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated a general policy in favor of 
arbitration, particularly in the international context.  In Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,300 the U.S. Supreme Court faced the 
issue of “whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve 
antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an 
international transaction.”301  Declaring that “we are well past the time when 
judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of 
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative 
means of dispute resolution,”302 the Court rejected the idea that a public 
policy against arbitrating United States statutory issues was dispositive.303  
On the contrary, the Court determined that interests in “international comity, 
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and 
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the 
parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be 
forthcoming in a domestic context.”304  The Court recognized that judicial 
branches worldwide would need to rid themselves of opposition to 
 
 298. See supra note 295–96 and accompanying text (observing that Holland was decided 
twenty-four years before SEUA). 
 299. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court declared that 
McCarran–Ferguson only grants states regulatory power over the insurance industry they enjoyed 
before SEUA). 
 300. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 301. Id. at 624. 
 302. Id. at 626–27. 
 303. Id. at 629 (disregarding the lower court’s finding that a public policy against allowing an 
arbitrator to decide issues under United States antitrust law rendered the arbitration clause 
unenforceable). 
 304. Id. at 629. 
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arbitration in order to allow the mechanism to take hold.305  Citing the New 
York Convention as evidence of a federal policy in favor of arbitration, the 
Court concluded that while “[t]here is no reason to distort the process of 
contract interpretation . . . in order to ferret out the inappropriate,”306 it is the 
“congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires 
courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by 
that Act . . . .”307 
There can be little doubt that Mitsubishi was a broad endorsement for a 
policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.308  It is important to keep 
in mind, however, that the presumption in favor of arbitration enunciated in 
Mitsubishi was created in the face of a countervailing policy, not a 
countervailing statute.309  While a policy and presumption in favor of 
arbitration may be sufficient to overcome significant opposing policy 
justifications, the same cannot be said of a conflict with a statutory directive. 
III. WHY THE CASE LAW HAS MISSED THE MARK 
The case law resolving the issue of whether the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act reverse preempts the New York Convention in favor of state law is both 
insufficient and largely unavailable.310  Subpart A of this Part describes the 
state of lower court decisions on the issue, and subpart B describes the 
current circuit split regarding its resolution. 
A. The Lower Courts 
Decisions of state courts and federal district courts that have ruled on 
the issue of whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act reverse preempts the New 
York Convention in favor of state law are almost entirely unavailable, as 
such rulings are made as nonfinal orders on motions to compel arbitration, 
 
 305. See id. at 638 (stating that because both international commercial transactions and the use 
of international arbitration had risen substantially, and judicial antagonism toward arbitration would 
need to end in order to allow this trend to continue). 
 306. Id. at 627. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See, e.g., Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness 
in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1039–40 (1998) (“The Court announced  an 
‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution’ and has proceeded in furtherance of 
that federal policy to embrace contractually based arbitration as a solution to a myriad of ills from 
overcrowded dockets to international sensitivities.” (quoting Mitsubishi, 437 U.S. at 631)). 
 309. Id. (stating that the policy enunciated in Mitsubishi was favored against a countervailing 
policy). 
 310. See infra Part III.A–B (describing the insufficiency and lack of availability of the existing 
case law). 
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which are almost never published or reported.311  For this reason, such 
decisions are not searchable and are not available in public databases.312  
Nevertheless, the issue arises constantly in lower courts.313  The few lower 
court opinions that can be found, show several ways in which this issue has 
been resolved.  Some courts do not recognize any significance in the fact 
that the New York Convention is a treaty and simply decide that neither the 
New York Convention nor the New York Convention Act regulate the 
“business of insurance” under McCarran–Ferguson.314  Others have decided 
that the New York Convention Act impliedly preempts any previously 
enacted statute and thus preempts the McCarran–Ferguson Act.315  Still 
others have decided that the federal policy favoring arbitration of 
international disputes is dispositive by itself.316  Not only have these 
decisions “given rise to division and confusion,”317 but in most jurisdictions, 
they do not have precedential effect.318  The confused results319 and cursory 
 
 311. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010) (No. 09-945) (“[T]he issue typically 
arises in the context of nonfinal decisions on motions to compel arbitration, virtually none of which 
are decided in reported opinions.”). 
 312. See id. (observing that unreported orders are not “available in searchable public databases 
like Lexis and Westlaw”). 
 313. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, La. Safety Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 65 (No. 09-945) 
(“[T]he question arises frequently in the lower courts . . . .  The issue presented in this case arises 
frequently in district courts, where it has given rise to division and confusion.”). 
 314. See, e.g., Transit Cas. Co. in Receivership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 
No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996) (stating that the New York 
Convention Act cannot preempt a Missouri statute voiding arbitration clauses in insurance 
agreements because “neither the Convention nor the Federal Arbitration Act specifically relate to the 
business of insurance”). 
 315. See, e.g., Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 
1306 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (“[T]he McCarran–Ferguson Act’s preservation of state insurance law 
defenses does not apply in the context of international arbitration because the text of the Convention 
is supreme.”); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-1071, 2007 WL 2752366, 
at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007) (“[T]he New York Convention must be enforced according to its 
terms over all prior inconsistent rules of law.”). 
 316. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Simon, No. 1:07-cv-0899-LJM-WTL, 
2007 WL 3047128, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2007) (“[T]here is a strong preference, as articulated by 
the Supreme Court, for recognition of international agreements to properly promote interests of 
comity and predictability in the enforcement of such agreements.  Therefore, this Court finds that the 
FAA, as it implements the Convention, governs the Arbitration Clause.”). 
 317. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 313, at 25. 
 318. See Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105 
A.L.R.5th 499 (2003) (“The rules and holdings of many state and federal courts provide that 
unpublished opinions cannot be considered to have precedential effect.”). 
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nature320 of these lower court decisions, as well as the lack of weight given 
to them, only add to the importance of the two U.S. Courts of Appeals cases 
that have decided this issue.321 
B. The Circuit Split 
Only the Second and Fifth Circuits have heard the issue of whether the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act reverse preempts the New York Convention in 
favor of state legislation prohibiting the enforcement of international 
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts.322  Section 1 of this subpart 
describes the Second Circuit’s opinion, and section 2 describes the Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion. 
1. Stephens v. American International Insurance Co. 
The issue of whether the New York Convention is preempted by state 
legislation under the McCarran–Ferguson Act was first heard by a U.S. 
Court of Appeals when the Second Circuit decided Stephens v. American 
International Insurance Co. in 1995.323  In Stephens, a reinsurance company, 
Delta America Re Insurance Company (Delta), was insolvent.324  Delta’s 
 
 319. See supra text accompanying note 317 (describing the lower court opinions as divided and 
confusing). 
 320. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text (providing descriptions of several lower 
court opinions and showing the conclusory nature of their reasoning). 
 321. See infra Part III.B.1–2 (providing a summary of the two U.S. Courts of Appeals opinions 
that deal with this issue). 
 322. See infra Part III.B (describing the two cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals). 
 323. Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
 324. See id. at 42 (“In 1985, the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky found Delta to be 
insolvent.”).  The New Jersey Supreme Court provides a helpful explanation of reinsurance in 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981): 
 324. See id. at 42 (“In 1985, the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky found Delta to be 
insolvent.”).  The New Jersey Supreme Court provides a helpful explanation of reinsurance in 
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981): 
Reinsurance involves a contract under which one insurer agrees to indemnify another for 
loss sustained under the latter’s policy of insurance.  Insurance companies that insure 
against losses arising out of fire or other casualty seek at times to minimize their 
exposure by sharing risks with other insurance companies.  Thus, when the face amount 
of a policy is comparatively large, the company may enlist one or more insurers to 
participate in that risk.  Similarly, an insurance company’s loss potential and overall 
exposure may be reduced by reinsuring a part of an entire class of policies (e. g., 25% of 
all of its fire insurance policies).  The selling insurance company is known as a ceding 
company.  The entity that assumes the obligation is designated as the reinsurer. 
 
Id. at 817. 
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liquidator was suing a number of insurance companies who had ceded risk to 
Delta for premiums in the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, and a dispute arose as to that claim.325  Delta’s reinsurance contracts 
with all of the insurance companies contained comprehensive arbitration 
provisions.326  One of the defendant insurance companies, British Aviation 
Insurance Company, Ltd., moved to compel arbitration under the New York 
Convention Act.327  Delta’s liquidator defended against the motion to compel 
arbitration, arguing that section 304.33-010(6) of the Kentucky Liquidation 
Act328 prohibited compelling arbitration.  British Aviation argued that the 
Kentucky legislation was preempted by the New York Convention Act.329  
Delta’s liquidator responded, stating that the McCarran–Ferguson Act 
reverse preempted the New York Convention Act.330  The district court 
compelled arbitration, holding that the Kentucky Liquidation Act was not 
meant to protect policyholders and therefore was not enacted “for the 
purpose of regulating the business of insurance” under the McCarran–
Ferguson Act and could not reverse preempt federal legislation.331  Delta’s 
 
 325. See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 42–43 (“[T]he Liquidator filed suit . . . against various companies 
who had ceded risk to Delta . . . seeking . . . recovery of premiums . . . .  The Cedents have refused to 
pay the premiums because they claim that they are entitled . . . to set off the premiums . . . .” ). 
 326. See id. at 43 (“All of the reinsurance contracts at issue contain broad arbitration clauses.”).  
 327. See id. (“British Aviation Insurance Company, Ltd. . . . moved to compel arbitration 
abroad, pursuant to [the New York Convention Act].”). 
 328. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-010(6) (West 2010).  Section 304.33-010(6) provides, in 
relevant part: 
 328. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.33-010(6) (West 2010).  Section 304.33-010(6) provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
If there is a delinquency proceeding under this subtitle, the provisions of this subtitle 
shall govern those proceedings, and all conflicting contractual provisions contained in 
any contract between the insurer which is subject to the delinquency proceeding and any 
third party shall be deemed subordinated to the provisions of this subtitle. 
 
Id. 
 329. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 43 (“The Cedents, however, asserted that the [New York Convention 
Act] preempts this section of the Kentucky Liquidation Act.”). 
 330. Id. (“The Liquidator maintained that the [New York Convention Act] does not apply 
because the McCarran–Ferguson Act . . . preserved the Kentucky Liquidation Act from 
preemption . . . .”). 
 331. See id. (stating that the district court held that the Kentucky legislation was not meant to 
protect policyholders and “granted Cedents’ motions to compel arbitration”). 
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liquidator moved for permission to appeal the district court’s order, and the 
Second Circuit granted the motion.332 
The Second Circuit found that the Kentucky Liquidation Act was 
enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance” under the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act, and that the New York Convention Act was 
therefore vulnerable to reverse preemption by the Kentucky legislation.333  
However, British Aviation argued that, despite the fact that the New York 
Convention Act is reverse preempted by the Kentucky Liquidation Act, the 
Convention itself compelled arbitration.334  The Second Circuit stated, 
without analysis, that the Convention is non-self-executing and depends on 
federal legislation for its implementation.335  The court therefore concluded 
that the New York Convention—as opposed to the New York Convention 
Act—was irrelevant to its analysis and overturned the order to compel 
arbitration.336 
2. Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London 
No other circuit court confronted the issue again until 2009, when the 
Fifth Circuit decided Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.337  In Safety National, an English 
reinsurer—Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London (CULL)—and an 
American reinsurer—Safety National Casualty Corporation (SNCC)—were 
in a dispute over whether an insurance company—the Louisiana Safety 
Association of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund (LSAT)—could assign its 
rights under its reinsurance agreement with CULL to SNCC.338  Both 
reinsurance agreements included arbitration provisions.339  SNCC sued 
 
 332. Id. (“This Court granted the Liquidator’s motion for permission to appeal Judge Martin’s 
interlocutory order compelling arbitration, and this appeal followed.”). 
 333. See id. at 43–45 (examining the Kentucky Liquidation Act and determining that it was 
enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance”). 
 334. Id. at 45 (“British Aviation . . . argue[s] that, as [a] foreign corporation[], even if the 
Kentucky Liquidation Act is not preempted by the [New York Convention Act], the Convention 
would still require arbitration of [its] claims.”). 
 335. See id. (“This argument fails because the Convention is not self-executing, and therefore, 
relies upon an Act of Congress for its implementation.”). 
 336. See id. at 45–46 (“The Convention itself is simply inapplicable in this instance. . . .  
Thus, . . . the Liquidator cannot be compelled to arbitrate and the District Court’s order compelling 
the Liquidator to arbitrate is hereby reversed.”). 
 337. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (2009). 
 338. See id. at 717 (“LSAT assigned its rights under the reinsurance agreements with the 
Underwriters to Safety National.  The Underwriters refused to recognize the assignment . . . .”). 
 339. Id. (“Each reinsurance agreement contained an arbitration provision.”). 
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CULL in district court, and CULL successfully moved to stay the 
proceedings and compel arbitration.340  In the course of the arbitration, 
CULL moved to lift the stay so that LSAT could be joined as a party in the 
district court, and then to once again compel arbitration.341  LSAT then 
moved to lift the stay but quash arbitration, arguing that the arbitration 
clauses were “unenforceable under Louisiana law.”342 
The district court granted LSAT’s motion, deciding that while the New 
York Convention would typically require arbitration, the New York 
Convention was reverse preempted by Louisiana law under the McCarran–
Ferguson Act.343  The district court then “certified that the order embodying 
its rulings involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal.”344  A 
panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, but a “[r]ehearing en banc was granted, 
thereby vacating the panel opinion.”345 
A thirteen judge majority of the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, focused 
the entirety of its analysis on one question: “[W]hether . . . the Convention is 
an ‘Act of Congress’ within the meaning of the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act . . . .”346  The relevant portion of the Louisiana statute is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 340. See id. (“Safety National sued the Underwriters in federal district court.  The Underwriters 
filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.  The district court initially 
granted the motion.”). 
 341. Id. (“The Underwriters then filed a motion to lift the stay in order to join LSAT as a party 
in the district court and to compel arbitration . . . .”). 
 342. Id. (“In response, LSAT moved to intervene, lift the stay, and quash arbitration.  LSAT 
asserted that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under Louisiana law.”). 
 343. See id. at 717–18 (“The district court . . . granted LSAT’s motion to quash arbitration.  The 
district court concluded that although the Convention would otherwise require arbitration, a 
Louisiana statute . . . reverse preempted the Convention because of the McCarran–Ferguson Act.”). 
 344. Id. at 718. 
 345. Id. 
 346. See id. (“The Underwriters raise three issues . . . .  Because our resolution of the first issue 
[(whether the Convention is an ‘Act of Congress’ under the McCarran–Ferguson Act)] resolves the 
question presented in this interlocutory appeal, we do not reach the other issues pressed by the 
Underwriters.”). 
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A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering 
subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . . shall contain any condition, 
stipulation, or agreement either:  
. . . .  
(2) Depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer. 
. . . . 
C. Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement in violation of this Section 
shall be void . . . .347 
The court noted that Louisiana courts have held arbitration agreements 
void as a result of this statute.348  Because the “Convention contemplates 
enforcement in a signatory nation’s courts,”349 the majority recognized that 
there was a conflict between the Louisiana statute and the New York 
Convention.350  LSAT argued that the Convention was non-self-executing 
and could thus only be applied in United States courts through its enabling 
legislation.351  For this reason, LSAT argued, the New York Convention Act 
is an “Act of Congress” under the McCarran–Ferguson Act, the New York 
Convention has no application, and the New York Convention Act must 
therefore be reverse preempted by the Louisiana statute under the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act.352  CULL argued that even if the treaty is non-self-
executing, it is still a treaty rather than an “Act of Congress” under the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act.353  Though the court briefly examined the 
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, it 
declined to decide whether the New York Convention was self-executing, 
 
 347. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:868 (2009). 
 348. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719 (“Although it is not clear from this provision’s text that 
arbitration agreements are voided, Louisiana courts have held that such agreements are 
unenforceable because of this statute.”). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. (“The Louisiana statute, as so interpreted, conflicts with the United States’s 
commitments under the Convention.”). 
 351. Id. at 721 (“LSAT contends that the Convention was not self-executing and could only 
have effect in the courts of this country when Congress passed enabling legislation.”). 
 352. Id. (“LSAT argues that the Convention’s enabling legislation is an ‘Act of Congress’ 
within . . . the McCarran–Ferguson Act[] . . . .  LSAT reasons that the Convention has no effect 
independent of legislation enabling it and that the McCarran–Ferguson Act requires us to construe 
the Convention’s enabling legislation as reverse-preempted by the Louisiana statute.”). 
 353. Id. (“[CULL] addressed whether the Convention is self-executing only in briefs to the 
panel and not in any depth, instead maintaining primarily that even if the Convention were not self-
executing, once implemented, it remains a treaty and is not an ‘Act of Congress’ within the meaning 
of the McCarran–Ferguson Act.”). 
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and proceeded under the assumption that the New York Convention—at 
least, in relevant part—was non-self-executing.354 
Nonetheless, the court accepted CULL’s argument that the New York 
Convention was not an “Act of Congress” under the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act and thus was not reverse preempted by the Louisiana legislation.355  
First, the court observed that the plain meaning of the phrase “Act of 
Congress” dictates such a reading,356 and that the differentiation between 
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties in this context is a distinction 
without a difference—the court could think of no reason why Congress 
would choose to distinguish between treaty provisions that are self-executing 
and non-self-executing.357 
Emphasizing the use of the word “construed” in the phrase “the 
McCarran–Ferguson Act’s provision that ‘no Act of Congress’ shall be 
construed to supersede state law,”358 the court clarified that it was the New 
York Convention itself, and not the New York Convention Act, that the 
court “construed” to preempt Louisiana law.359  The majority reasoned that 
the New York Convention Act operates by reference to the New York 
Convention, and the New York Convention must therefore be 
“construed.”360  Consequently, the court determined that “the McCarran–
Ferguson Act’s provision that ‘no Act of Congress’ shall be construed to 
 
 354. Id. at 721–22 (“It is unclear to us whether the Convention is self-executing. . . .  However, 
the Supreme Court indicated . . . that [some] provisions of the Convention . . . are not . . . .  
This . . . could . . . imply that the Convention in its entirety is not self-executing, although such a 
conclusion cannot be drawn with any certainty . . . .”). 
 355. Id. (“Even if the Convention required legislation to implement some or all of its provisions 
in United States courts, that does not mean that Congress intended an ‘Act of Congress’ as that 
phrase is used in the McCarran–Ferguson Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that has 
been implemented by congressional legislation.”). 
 356. Id. at 723 (“The commonly understood meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not include a 
‘treaty,’ even if the treaty required implementing legislation.”). 
 357. Id. (“Yet there is no apparent reason—and LSAT has provided no rationale—why 
Congress would have chosen to distinguish in the McCarran–Ferguson Act between treaty 
provisions that are self-executing and those that are not self-executing but have been 
implemented.”). 
 358. Id. at 725. 
 359. Id. at 724 (“Equally important in the present case, it is a treaty (the Convention), not an act 
of Congress (the Convention Act), that we construe to supersede Louisiana law.”). 
 360. Id. at 724–25 (stating that the New York Convention Act “does not in this case operate 
without reference to the contents of the Convention,” and that it is the New York Convention itself 
that the New York Convention Act deems contracts to be governed by and uses as the jurisdiction-
providing authority, among other references). 
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supersede state law regulating the business of insurance is inapplicable.”361  
Significantly, the court stated that it “need not and d[oes] not undertake to 
determine the precise or technical contours of how or whether implemented 
non-self-executing treaty provisions become the ‘Law of the Land’ under the 
Supremacy Clause.”362  The court explained that its task was merely to 
determine whether “Congress intended for state law to reverse preempt 
federal law that has, as its source an implemented non-self-executing 
treaty.”363 
The majority concluded that this was not Congress’s intent, basing its 
conclusion on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland.364  
The Safety National court reasoned that because the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined in Holland that the constitutionality of a federal statute 
implementing a non-self-executing treaty hinged on the constitutionality of 
the treaty itself,365 Holland supported the proposition that an implemented 
non-self-executing treaty is wholly distinct from an “Act of Congress,” and 
determined that when Congress enacted the McCarran–Ferguson Act over 
twenty years later—and the New York Convention Act over fifty years 
later—it was aware of this inferred distinction.366  Thus, the majority decided 
it was “unlikely that when Congress crafted the McCarran–Ferguson Act, it 
intended any future treaty implemented by an Act of Congress to be 
abrogated.”367 
The Fifth Circuit further stated that its conclusion was supported by the 
federal policy favoring arbitration of international commercial contracts.368  
 
 361. Id. at 725. 
 362. Id. at 727. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 727–28 (“There is precedent that at the time of the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s 
enactment, courts analyzed treaties, even when implemented by an Act of Congress, as treaties.  The 
Supreme Court’s decision . . . reflects that a treaty followed by implementing legislation remains a 
treaty . . . distinct from an Act of Congress.”). 
 365. See id. at 728 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court saw a distinction between  “acts of 
Congress under the Commerce Clause” and an act enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
implement a non-self-executing treaty, and decided that the “validity of the implementing 
legislation” depended on the constitutionality of the treaty (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 
433 (1920))). 
 366. See id. at 728–29 (“[W]hen Congress passed the McCarran–Ferguson Act two decades 
later (and the Convention Act half a century later), it was well aware that a treaty, even if requiring 
implementation, was distinct from an Act of Congress and could serve as the source of authority to 
‘override [a state’s] power.’” (quoting Holland, 252 U.S. at 434)). 
 367. Id. at 729. 
 368. Id. at 730 (“Our conclusion that referral to arbitration is proper in this case is bolstered by 
the congressionally sanctioned national policy favoring arbitration of international commercial 
agreements.”). 
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The court cited Mitsubishi369 as establishing that courts must “subordinate 
domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring 
commercial arbitration.”370  The majority recognized that the McCarran–
Ferguson Act evinces a policy in favor of state regulation of the insurance 
industry, but found that any apprehensions about that policy being ignored in 
the course of arbitration are insufficient to allow a court to refuse to let 
arbitration proceed.371 
The majority noted the split it had created with the Second Circuit.372  
While the court agreed with the Second Circuit that non-self-executing 
treaty provisions may not be judicially enforced without implementing 
legislation,373 the Fifth Circuit stated that “this does not answer the question 
of what Congress intended when it used the terms ‘[n]o Act of Congress’ 
and ‘such Act’ in the McCarran–Ferguson Act or why Congress would have 
addressed only treaties that required implementation by Congress.”374  
Rather, the majority said that the plain meanings of those terms suggest that 
they were not meant to encompass an implemented, non-self-executing 
treaty,375 and that the text of the McCarran–Ferguson Act does not denote an 
intention by Congress to distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties.376 
The judgment of the majority was joined by Judge Clement, who 
authored a concurring opinion.377  The concurring opinion took the view that 
Article II of the New York Convention is self-executing and thus preempts 
 
 369. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 370. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 730 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638–39). 
 371. Id. (“Although the McCarran–Ferguson Act embodies a strong policy that the states have 
an interest in the regulation of the business . . . , concerns that a state’s regulatory policies . . . may 
not be recognized in an international arbitration . . . are not a basis for refusing to require that an 
arbitration go forward.”). 
 372. Id. at 731 (“We are aware that our decision conflicts with that of the Second Circuit in 
Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.”). 
 373. Id. (“We agree, of course, that when provisions of a treaty are not self-executing, they 
cannot be enforced in a court in this country unless and until those provisions are implemented by 
Congress.”). 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. (“Because we give the phrases . . . their usual, commonly understood meaning, we 
conclude that implemented treaty provisions, self-executing or not, are not reverse-preempted by 
state law pursuant to the McCarran–Ferguson Act.”). 
 376. Id. (“We find no indication from the text of the McCarran–Ferguson Act that Congress 
intended to signal a distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing-but-implemented 
treaties in the McCarran–Ferguson’s reverse-preemption clause.”). 
 377. Id. at 730 (Clement, J., concurring). 
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the Louisiana statute under the Supremacy Clause.378  Judge Clement 
explained that not only would such a holding be in keeping with U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent,379 but that this was a better conclusion because it 
avoids the constitutional question of whether an implemented non-self-
executing treaty should be regarded as having preemptive effect under the 
Supremacy Clause.380  The concurring opinion first cited Medellín v. Texas, 
stating that the Medellín Court delineated a structure for establishing 
whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing.381  The concurring 
opinion went on to explain the basis for its conclusion that the relevant 
provision of the New York Convention is self-executing under the Medellín 
framework, noting the use of the word “shall” in section 3 of Article II of the 
New York Convention.382  While the concurring opinion noted the “growing 
judicial consensus that multilateral treaties are presumptively non-self-
executing,”383 it nevertheless determined that, per the guidance of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the relevant provision of the New York Convention is self-
executing.384 
The Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion was also met by a “scathing 
dissent.”385  In an opinion joined by two other judges, Judge Elrod began this 
dissent by declaring that the majority “conclude[d] that an Act of Congress 
is not really an Act of Congress.”386  Judge Elrod found the majority opinion 
fundamentally problematic because it looked beyond the New York 
Convention Act to the New York Convention387 and determined that this 
 
 378. Id. at 732 (“I would hold that the relevant treaty provision, Article II of the Convention, is 
self-executing and that it therefore preempts [the Louisiana statute] by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause.”). 
 379. Id. (“This result is dictated by the decisions of the Supreme Court . . . differentiating self-
executing from non-self-executing treaty provisions.”). 
 380. See id. at 732–33 (“The conclusion that Article II is self-executing possesses the added 
benefit of avoiding a difficult constitutional question, namely what preemptive effect (if any) non-
self-executing but implemented treaty provisions have under the Supremacy Clause.”). 
 381. See id. at 734 (“Medellín provides lower courts with a framework for determining whether 
treaty provisions are self-executing.”). 
 382. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (explaining that the language in the New 
York Convention directing courts to enforce arbitration agreements appears mandatory). 
 383. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, J., concurring). 
 384. Id. (“[M]y conclusion that Article II of the Convention is self-executing is compelled by a 
straightforward application of binding Supreme Court precedent. . . .  Because Article II of the 
Convention mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements, it conflicts with and therefore preempts 
Louisiana law.”). 
 385. Timothy B. Parlin, Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance Contracts Trump State 
Law Restrictions, 199 N.J. L.J. 578, 579 (2010). 
 386. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 737 (Elrod, J., dissenting). 
 387. See id. at 737–38 (“The court errs today in . . . garden variety statutory interpretation: 
instead of answering the question of whether the legislation implementing the Convention . . . is an 
54
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss2/3
[Vol. 12: 267, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
321 
error led the majority to a severely flawed conclusion.388  The dissent labeled 
the majority’s holding “a doctrinal novelty of our circuit’s own creation, as 
there is no precedent holding that a non-self-executing treaty, in and of 
itself, has the power to preempt state law.”389  Judge Elrod also chastised the 
majority for its “trail-blazing holding” because it “create[d] a circuit split 
with the Second Circuit and [went] against other circuits that have concluded 
that a non-self-executing treaty, even if implemented by statute, may not be 
applied directly in U.S. courts.”390 
Judge Elrod advocated for a systematic analysis.391  He stated that the 
majority should have noted that, under the Supremacy Clause, Louisiana law 
would apply unless a federal statute preempted it.392  Thus, if the New York 
Convention Act is the source of preemptive law, the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act would apply.393  One can assume this would be the end of such an 
analysis.  If the source of preemptive law is the New York Convention, 
however, the McCarran–Ferguson Act would not apply.394  Therefore, the 
dissent determined that the Louisiana law cannot be preempted unless the 
New York Convention is preemptive of Louisiana law under Supremacy 
Clause analysis, which, the dissent concluded, is not the case.395  Citing U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent, Judge Elrod asserted that “only self-executing 
treaties operate by their own force to provide a rule of decision in the 
courts.”396  Thus, the opinion reasoned, only self-executing treaties can have 
 
‘Act of Congress’ . . . , the court frames its approach as an inquiry into whether the Convention itself 
is an Act of Congress.”). 
 388. See id. at 738 (“However, the court’s failure to ask the right question at the outset 
inevitably leads to its incorrect conclusion—that the Convention itself, a non-self-executing treaty, 
preempts the Louisiana statute.”). 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. (stating that the majority should have used an ordered analysis). 
 392. Id. (“From the perspective of the Supremacy Clause, [Louisiana law] applies unless 
[CULL] carr[ies] the burden to show that some specific source of federal law preempts it.”).  
 393. Id. at 738–39 (“If the proposed preemptive law is a statute like the Convention Act, then 
the McCarran–Ferguson Act applies.”). 
 394. Id. at 739 (“If the proposed law is the Convention itself, then the court is correct that 
McCarran–Ferguson does not apply.”). 
 395. See id. (“But there is still no preemption—and the district court must be affirmed—unless 
the Convention is actually capable of superseding [Louisiana law] as a matter of Supremacy Clause 
law.  It is not.”). 
 396. Id. 
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preemptive effect.397  Because the majority cited no case law specifically in 
support of its position,398 and because “[a]s a source of law, the 
implementing legislation is the alpha and omega of what may constitute a 
rule of decision in U.S. courts,”399 the dissent concluded that when it comes 
to non-self-executing treaties, any preemptive effect originates in the 
implementing legislation, not in the treaty. 
The dissent further criticized the majority’s use of Missouri v. 
Holland—observing that it was the only decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
that the majority cited to support its preemption analysis400—and dismissed 
Holland as “irrelevant to the Supremacy Clause question before this 
court.”401  The true significance of the holding in Missouri v. Holland, Judge 
Elrod stated, is that the analysis in that case is of the implementing 
legislation, not the treaty at issue.402  Thus, Missouri v. Holland did not 
appear to the dissent to be supportive of the majority’s conclusion.403 
Conceding that the majority did not intend to create new Supremacy 
Clause jurisprudence, Judge Elrod nevertheless stated unequivocally that this 
is what the majority did.404  Otherwise, the majority would have employed 
“a sort of legal alchemy, in which the court bestows on the Convention Act 
the beneficial properties of a statute . . . but not its drawbacks.”405  The 
dissent found this approach untenable, stating simply that because a non-
self-executing treaty cannot preempt state law, its implementing legislation 
 
 397. See id. at 740 (“Therefore, treaties come in two separate and distinct types: self-executing 
treaties, which can undoubtedly preempt state law in a case like this, and non-self-executing treaties, 
which cannot.”). 
 398. Id. (“The court points to no case holding that a non-self-executing treaty can supersede 
state law.”). 
 399. Id. at 740–41. 
 400. See id. (“Missouri v. Holland . . . is the only Supreme Court holding upon which the court 
purports to ground its conclusion that the non-self-executing Convention is capable of preemption, 
and that courts should look to the treaty, rather than to the implementing legislation, to see if it is an 
‘Act of Congress.’”). 
 401. Id. 
 402. See id. (“What is relevant to this case is not the holding of Holland, but the manner in 
which it frames the conflict between an implemented treaty and state law prerogatives embodied in a 
Missouri statute.  It is clear from the first sentence of Holland that the implementing act—not the 
treaty—is considered the source of the conflict.”). 
 403. Id. (“There is no contention or holding in Missouri v. Holland that a court could apply a 
non-self-executing treaty, implemented or not, to supersede state law.”). 
 404. See id. at 745 (“Perhaps the court today does not really mean to cut a new path through 
Supremacy Clause territory to endow non-self-executing treaties with heretofore undiscovered 
preemptive powers.  But that is what it must do in order to justify framing its approach as an inquiry 
into whether the Convention itself is an ‘Act of Congress.’”). 
 405. Id. 
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is the only source of law a court may consult in the course of a McCarran–
Ferguson reverse preemption analysis.406 
The dissent observed that the majority had bolstered its decision to see 
the New York Convention rather than the New York Convention Act as 
preemptive because the Act incorporates the Convention largely by 
reference.407  This, said the dissent, was merely a “play on words,”408 taking 
the word “construe” from the McCarran–Ferguson Act language, “[n]o Act 
of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law,”409 and applying it to “Act of Congress” rather than “invalidate, impair, 
or supersede,” at which it is directed.410  The majority’s reading in this 
respect, Judge Elrod maintained, was novel: “None have suggested that the 
Convention Act’s failure to cut-and-paste the language of the treaty into the 
statute somehow prevents the statute from being an ‘Act of Congress,’ 
capable of being ‘construed.’”411 
Thus, the dissent regarded the majority as having “muddied the waters 
of our statutory interpretation jurisprudence, by reasoning [what Congress 
likely intended] on an ad hoc basis”412 and “appl[ying] a non-self-executing 
treaty as domestic, preemptive law in an unprecedented manner,”413 deeming 
the case to be left in “Supremacy Clause purgatory.”414 
C. The Case Law Is Insufficient and Problematic 
Neither the lower court opinions nor the two appellate court opinions 
that have attempted to resolve the issue of whether McCarran–Ferguson can 
reverse preempt the New York Convention have satisfactorily answered the 
 
 406. Id. (“Because a non-self-executing treaty cannot preempt state law, the court cannot 
analyze the ineffectual treaty rather than the implementing legislation to determine the reverse-
preemptive effects of the McCarran–Ferguson Act.”). 
 407. See id. at 747 (“The court justifies its decision to look to the Convention rather than the 
Convention Act on the ground that the Convention Act implements the Convention largely by 
reference, as opposed to setting out the Convention provisions within the text of the Act.”).  
 408. See id. 
 409. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2010). 
 410. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 747 (Elrod, J., dissenting) (“The argument is essentially a 
play on words, which wrenches the word ‘construe’ from the verb phrase in which it appears in the 
statute . . . .  Thus, ‘construe’ does not merely mean to refer to the text for content.”). 
 411. Id. at 748. 
 412. Id. at 752. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
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most pertinent questions.  The lower court opinions, in the few 
circumstances where they are available,415 lack precedential effect and lead 
to varied, unsupported conclusions.416  The two U.S. Courts of Appeals that 
have heard the issue have come to opposing conclusions,417 each with 
tenuous reasoning.  The Second Circuit’s opinion provides very little 
analysis,418 simply concluding that as a non-self-executing treaty, the New 
York Convention bore no consideration, so the New York Convention Act 
was reverse preempted by McCarran–Ferguson.419 
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion, which provided the most comprehensive 
analysis of this issue,420 was founded on problematic reasoning and overly 
imaginative interpretations of precedent.  The Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
essentially relied on four propositions: (1) that the phrase “Act of Congress” 
does not plainly encompass a non-self-executing treaty;421 (2) that the 
majority could not find a reason why Congress would choose to differentiate 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties;422 (3) that the New 
York Convention Act incorporated the New York Convention by reference, 
and that the majority was therefore “construing” the Convention rather than 
the Convention Act;423 and (4) that Holland’s ruling that treaty-
implementing legislation’s constitutionality is based on the constitutionality 
of the treaty supports the view that non-self-executing treaties are not “Acts 
of Congress.”424  All of these conclusions are wholly rebutted by Judge 
Elrod’s point that LSAT was invoking the New York Convention Act, rather 
than the New York Convention.425 
 
 415. See supra notes 311–13 and accompanying text (explaining that lower court opinions on 
this issue are almost never published). 
 416. See supra Part III.A (explaining that lower court opinions have come to different, 
conclusory results and do not have weight as precedent). 
 417. See supra Part III.B (describing the two opinions and their opposing results). 
 418. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the Second Circuit’s opinion and its short analysis). 
 419. See supra notes 335–36 and accompanying text (delineating the conclusion of the Second 
Circuit’s opinion, which deemed the New York Convention Act reverse preempted). 
 420. See generally supra Part III. 
 421. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (providing the majority’s argument that the 
plain meaning of “Act of Congress” does not include non-self-executing treaties). 
 422. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (stating that the majority could see no reason 
why Congress would choose to differentiate between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). 
 423. See supra notes 358–61 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority read the word 
“construe” to imply that a statute incorporating a treaty by reference is “construed” by reference to 
the treaty it implements). 
 424. See supra notes 364–66 (stating that the majority cited Holland as supportive of the 
proposition that non-self-executing treaties are not “Acts of Congress”). 
 425. See supra notes 395–98 (explaining Judge Elrod’s position that the majority ignored the 
fact that the New York Convention Act, not the New York Convention, was effective law in the 
court). 
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It would have been possible for the majority to make an argument under 
the Supremacy Clause that the New York Convention, as implemented by 
the New York Convention Act, operates as a treaty rather than an Act of 
Congress.  After all, the Supremacy Clause declares “Treaties” and “Laws of 
the United States” to be the “supreme Law of the Land” separately.426  
Moreover, the Framers’ intent in declaring treaties the “supreme Law of the 
Land” had its own independent justification—the breach of treaties on the 
part of the British and early Americans.427  The Framers specifically 
declared treaties the “supreme Law of the Land” in order to avoid discord in 
the way treaty obligations are honored.428  The U.S. Supreme Court has had 
no occasion to rule on the issue of whether implemented, non-self-executing 
treaties preempt state law as “Treaties” or as “Laws of the United States” 
because under longstanding U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, they each 
have preemptive effect.429  However, a court could reasonably conclude, 
from the text of the Constitution and the original intent of the Framers, that 
treaties are “supreme” as treaties, regardless of their status as self-executing 
or non-self-executing.430  This argument would even accord with the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee’s recently enunciated understanding that “all 
treaties—whether self-executing or not—are the supreme law of the land.”431  
However, the Fifth Circuit explicitly disclaimed any reading of its opinion as 
utilizing the Supremacy Clause.432 
 
 426. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supremacy Clause says 
that  “the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land”). 
 427. See supra notes 156–160 and accompanying text (recounting how the Framers kept their 
experiences with Britain and early Americans in mind while crafting the Supremacy Clause, seeking 
to avoid the problems that arise when federal and state governments defy treaties). 
 428. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (stating that the Supremacy Clause was 
drafted with the idea that the state and the federal governments’ abilities to breach treaty obligations 
would be limited). 
 429. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (“We have held that an Act of Congress is 
on a full parity with a treaty . . . .”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“By the 
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing . . . with an act of legislation.  Both are declared 
by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land.”). 
 430. See supra notes 426–28 and accompanying text (describing how the text of the Supremacy 
Clause and the Framers’ intent in enacting it do not indicate that there was any attempt to distinguish 
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties). 
 431. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110–12, at 9–10 (2008). 
 432. See supra note 362 and accompanying text (noting that the majority expressly stated that 
its analysis was divorced from the law of the Supremacy Clause). 
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The majority relied instead on Congress’s understanding that non-self-
executing treaties would not be seen as different from self-executing treaties, 
as evidenced by the language of McCarran–Ferguson and the majority’s 
inability to see a reason why Congress would want to distinguish between 
the two.433  This reasoning overlooks the fact that this distinction, which 
leaves non-self-executing treaties without the force of domestic law, had 
been settled law for more than 100 years when McCarran–Ferguson was 
enacted.434  As Judge Elrod observed, Holland did not change this fact,435 but 
instead gave independent constitutional authority for treaty-implementing 
legislation, leaving that legislation as the sole source of domestic legal 
effect.436  Additionally, the majority’s assertion that it was “construing” the 
New York Convention was, as Judge Elrod pointed out, a misreading of the 
word “construe”437 that would also have the bizarre effect of interpreting 
Congress’s intent in enacting McCarran–Ferguson to allow reverse 
preemption of treaty-implementing legislation that copies the text of the 
treaty within the statute, but not of treaty-implementing legislation that only 
incorporates a treaty by reference.438 
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion is problematic both in its own right and in its 
contribution to the confusion related to this issue, resulting in a continuing 
trend of varied lower court decisions regarding this problem.439  However, 
the Fifth Circuit need not have employed such reasoning to come to its 
conclusion.  Part IV lays out a framework through which courts may 
effectively resolve the issue of whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act may 
reverse preempt the New York Convention under areas of the law that are 
well settled but which have not been utilized in analyzing this perplexing 
issue.440 
 
 433. See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s rationale). 
 434. See supra Part II.C (describing the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties and tracing the lineage of this to the early nineteenth century). 
 435. See supra notes 400–03 (noting the dissent’s point that Holland has no bearing on the 
status of non-self-executing treaties themselves). 
 436. See supra Part II.D (delineating the Holland decision, which deemed treaty-implementing 
legislation constitutionally sanctioned but did not suggest that non-self-executing treaties could have 
domestic legal effect). 
 437. See supra notes 407–11 and accompanying text (stating that the dissent termed the 
majority’s use of the word “construe” as a “play on words”). 
 438. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (recounting Judge Elrod’s statement that 
“[n]one have suggested that the Convention Act’s failure to cut-and-paste the language of the treaty 
into the statute somehow prevents the statute from being an ‘Act of Congress,’ capable of being 
‘construed’”). 
 439. See supra notes 313–21 and accompanying text (describing the confusing and 
contradictory opinions that continue to come out of the lower courts). 
 440. See infra Part IV (providing the analysis courts should use in deciding this issue). 
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IV. SOLUTION 
This Part provides the analysis a court should use when it encounters a 
conflict regarding whether the McCarran–Ferguson Act can reverse preempt 
the New York Convention in favor of a state law prohibiting the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.  The 
appropriate framework specifies that the court should first determine 
whether the conditions for McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption are 
present.441  Next, it should establish whether the New York Convention is 
non-self-executing.442  The court should then proceed to analyze the issue 
under Supremacy Clause jurisprudence.443  Ultimately, the court would be 
obligated to conclude that the McCarran–Ferguson Act cannot reverse 
preempt the New York Convention under the Treaty power and the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.444 
The court should begin by deciding whether the three prerequisites for 
McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption are met.445  The New York 
Convention Act must be considered a federal statute of general 
applicability—in other words, a statute that does not specifically regulate the 
business of insurance.446  The court would conclude that the New York 
Convention Act is unquestionably such a statute, as it applies broadly to all 
international arbitration agreements.447  Second, the state law must have 
been intended to regulate “the business of insurance.”448  Based on U.S. 
 
 441. See infra notes 445–52 and accompanying text (laying out the analysis to follow in 
deciding whether McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption may take place). 
 442. See infra notes 453–57 and accompanying text (describing the framework for determining 
whether the New York Convention is a self-executing treaty). 
 443. See infra notes 458–60 and accompanying text (providing an argument for preemption by 
the New York Convention under the Supremacy Clause). 
 444. See infra notes 461–73 and accompanying text (explaining why the treaty power and 
Foreign Commerce Clause dictate the conclusion that the McCarran–Ferguson Act is unable to 
reverse preempt the New York Convention). 
 445. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (stating that there are three conditions that must 
be satisfied before McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption may take place). 
 446. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that the first prerequisite to 
McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption is the existence of a federal statute of general applicability). 
 447. See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2010) (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a 
legal relationship . . . falls under the Convention.”). 
 448. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that the second prerequisite to 
McCarran–Ferguson reverse preemption is the existence of a state law enacted in order to regulate 
“the business of insurance”). 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence,449 the court must rule that such a state law 
does regulate “the business of insurance” because the law affects only those 
involved in the insurance industry,450 arbitration agreements are an important 
aspect of the insurance policy relationship,451 and the state law is certainly 
intended to govern the “business of insurance.”452 
Having determined that the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s reverse 
preemption prerequisites are met, the court should then determine whether it 
is legally sound for the McCarran–Ferguson Act to reverse preempt the New 
York Convention.  The court will be faced with the question of whether the 
New York Convention is an “Act of Congress,” which requires a 
determination as to whether the New York Convention is self-executing or 
non-self-executing, because if the New York Convention is self-executing, it 
has domestic legal effect of its own and cannot be an “Act of Congress.”453  
Despite the New York Convention’s mandatory language,454 the court would 
be obligated to deem the New York Convention non-self-executing because 
the explicit intent and understanding of the Executive Branch and the Senate 
that ratified the treaty was that the New York Convention is non-self-
executing,455 and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly regarded that to be 
the definitive indicator of whether a treaty is self-executing or not.456  
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated in dictum its own 
understanding that the New York Convention is non-self-executing.457 
The court could then advance the argument that despite the New York 
Convention’s non-self-executing status, the Convention is still a treaty under 
 
 449. See supra notes 96–110 (delineating the U.S. Supreme Court’s tests for determining what 
statutes regulate “the business of insurance”). 
 450. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that statutes declaring international 
arbitration agreements in insurance contracts unenforceable affects only entities in the insurance 
industry). 
 451. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that arbitration agreements are a 
fundamental part of the insurance policy relationship). 
 452. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s more 
expansive test for statutes that regulate the “business of insurance”). 
 453. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating that self-executing treaties have 
automatic domestic legal force). 
 454. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (explaining that the New York Convention’s 
language is mandatory). 
 455. See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text (explaining how President Johnson and 
the 1968 Senate understood the New York Convention to be non-self-executing and intended it to be 
so). 
 456. See supra notes 216, 219–220 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court opinions that have 
deemed the intent of the Executive Branch and the Senate to be the determinative indicator of 
whether a treaty is self-executing or not). 
 457. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (recounting that the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed in dictum that the New York Convention is non-self-executing). 
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the Supremacy Clause and is therefore not an “Act of Congress.”  Under this 
analysis, the court would reason that, based on the text of the Constitution 
and the intent of the Framers in drafting the Supremacy Clause, even non-
self-executing treaties are preemptive as treaties, not as federal law.458  
However, some courts would be reticent to advance such a proposition, as 
Judge Elrod was in Safety National,459 because the U.S. Supreme Court has 
provided no basis for the idea that an implemented, non-self-executing treaty 
ever operates as anything other than the federal law that implements it—and 
has no reason to in any other context.460  Regardless, the court need not 
entertain that argument at all, since by virtue of the Treaty power and the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, McCarran–Ferguson cannot reverse preempt the 
New York Convention anyhow. 
Under its Treaty power, Congress has constitutionally delegated 
authority to pass legislation implementing non-self-executing treaties 
without regard to whether it would have the power to enact the same 
legislation in the absence of such a treaty.461  The Treaty power thus 
constitutes an independent source of authority under which Congress 
implemented the New York Convention through the New York Convention 
Act.462  Because the U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled that the McCarran–
Ferguson Act only lifts Commerce Clause restrictions on the states’ ability 
to regulate the insurance industry,463 the McCarran–Ferguson Act cannot 
reverse preempt legislation that was implemented under Congress’s Treaty 
 
 458. See supra notes 426–28 and accompanying text (noting that a historical and textual 
reading of the Supremacy Clause indicates that implemented, non-self-executing treaties are 
preemptive as treaties rather than federal law). 
 459. See supra notes 394, 404–06 and accompanying text (describing Judge Elrod’s contempt 
for the idea of creating new Supremacy Clause jurisprudence on the issue of the preemptive effect of 
implemented, non-self-executing treaties, where no case law previously existed). 
 460. See supra note 429 and accompanying text (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
had occasion to rule on the issue of whether a non-self-executing treaty is preemptive as a treaty or a 
federal law because in any other context it would not matter). 
 461. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (explaining the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
that Congress’s Treaty power enables it to enact legislation that it would not have the constitutional 
authority to enact in the absence of a treaty). 
 462. See supra Part II.D (explaining that Congress’s treaty power represents an independent 
grant of power to Congress through which it implemented the New York Convention). 
 463. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
that the McCarran–Ferguson Act only represented Congress’s acquiescence to abrogation of its 
Commerce Clause power). 
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power.464  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that McCarran–
Ferguson only reverses the Court’s SEUA decision.465  SEUA came after the 
U.S. Supreme Court established the Treaty power, so Congress could not 
have intended for McCarran–Ferguson to abrogate its Treaty power because 
the states could not have done so before SEUA.466  The court must therefore 
hold that McCarran–Ferguson cannot reverse preempt the New York 
Convention. 
There is an additional reason why a court hearing this issue would be 
compelled to hold McCarran–Ferguson incapable of reverse preempting the 
New York Convention.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 
Congress’s acquiescence to state regulation of the insurance industry under 
the McCarran–Ferguson Act as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s 
Interstate Commerce Clause power,467 the Court has never upheld 
Congress’s acquiescence to state regulation of any matter as a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s Foreign Commerce Power.468  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision that Congress could assent to state regulation of interstate 
commerce was premised primarily on the interests of accommodating 
federalism and deferring to Congress’s prerogative to control interstate 
commerce as it sees fit.469  Additionally, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding the Foreign Commerce Clause, in contrast, has established that the 
underlying reason for the Foreign Commerce Clause is ensuring national 
uniformity.470  The U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled that the Constitution’s 
grant of Admiralty power to Congress is justified by a need for national 
 
 464. See supra text accompanying note 297 (reasoning that the McCarran–Ferguson Act does 
not reverse preempt legislation that was implemented under the Treaty power). 
 465. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (explaining that McCarran–Ferguson reverses 
SEUA). 
 466. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (explaining that McCarran–Ferguson merely 
reversed SEUA and that because the states could not have abrogated Congress’s Treaty power pre-
SEUA, the states could not do so after McCarran–Ferguson either). 
 467. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision to uphold Congress’s assent to state regulation of the insurance industry under McCarran–
Ferguson as a constitutional exercise of its Interstate Commerce Clause power). 
 468. See supra Part II.E (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s entire line of Foreign Commerce 
Clause cases, none of which examined an attempt by Congress to assent to state regulation of foreign 
commerce). 
 469. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423–24, 430–31 (1946) (describing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision upholding Congress’s acquiescence to state regulation of interstate 
commerce, and explaining that it was based on interests in federalism and deference to Congress’s 
judgment regarding interstate commerce). 
 470. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
statement that the rationale for the Constitution’s grant of Foreign Commerce power to Congress is 
national uniformity). 
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uniformity,471 and that Congress is unable to acquiesce to state regulation of 
matters falling under Congress’s Admiralty power because granting that 
power to the states would eradicate the national harmony of law that 
Congress is meant to maintain.472  Because the Admiralty power and the 
Foreign Commerce Clause share the same rationale, national uniformity, 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent militates the conclusion that Congress may 
not constitutionally abrogate its Foreign Commerce Clause power by 
acquiescing to state regulation of foreign commerce anymore than it can 
abrogate its Admiralty Power—that is, not at all.  Under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Foreign Commerce Clause framework, the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in international commercial transactions under the 
New York Convention is completely and unquestionably within the purview 
of Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause.473  Hence, the 
court must hold that under the Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress may not 
assent to state regulation of international arbitration agreements in insurance 
contracts. 
A court charged with resolving the issue of whether the McCarran–
Ferguson Act may reverse preempt the New York Convention in favor of 
state legislation prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
international insurance contracts must rule in favor of the New York 
Convention.  The Treaty power and the Foreign Commerce Clause 
necessarily prohibit any other result.474  This outcome also accords with 
cannons of interpretation that direct courts to resolve ambiguities in statutory 
interpretation in favor of compliance with international law,475 as well as the 
 
 471. See supra notes 273–74 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision that the need for national uniformity is the sole rationale underlying Congress’s Admiralty 
power). 
 472. See supra notes 274–77 and accompanying text (recounting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling that Congress may not assent to state regulation of issues falling under the Admiralty power 
and the justifications for that ruling). 
 473. See supra notes 297–81 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence and explaining why the enforcement of international 
arbitration agreements implicates the Foreign Commerce Clause to the highest degree). 
 474. See supra notes 461–73 and accompanying text (describing how the Treaty power and the 
Foreign Commerce Clause prohibit the McCarran–Ferguson Act from reverse preempting the New 
York Convention). 
 475. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 117 (1804) (“It has . . . been observed 
that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”). 
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U.S. Supreme Court’s enunciated federal policy favoring arbitration in 
international agreements.476 
V. CONCLUSION 
Parties seeking to enforce arbitration agreements are attempting to 
exercise their bargained-for rights.  In many cases, these parties have given 
up value and bargaining power in order to be entitled to the benefits of 
neutrality, autonomy, and control.  Moreover, these parties have relied on 
the benefit of having their disputes resolved outside of potentially hostile, 
foreign courts.  When courts deem the McCarran–Ferguson Act to reverse 
preempt the New York Convention in favor of arbitration-averse state 
legislation, those courts are not only denying a party its entitlements, but are 
also contravening well-settled law.  In cases where the McCarran–Ferguson 
Act and the New York Convention clash, the Foreign Commerce Clause and 
the Treaty power stand for the proposition that Congress cannot and has not 
assented to state legislation that prohibits the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses in international insurance agreements.  Courts should not only rule in 
favor of enforcing arbitration agreements under these circumstances, but 
they should abide by the settled principles that the Foreign Commerce 
Clause and the Treaty power establish, so that consistent, just results become 
the norm when this issue arises. 
 
 
 476. See supra Part II.F (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of a federal policy 
favoring arbitration in international agreements). 
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